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AFIT/ISE/ENV/11-J01 
Abstract 
 
 
In support of senior leadership emphasis on improving early systems engineering and 
analysis, the Enterprise Requirements and Acquisition Model (ERAM) is a quantitative discrete-
event process simulation model accounting for activities from early capability analysis through 
system fielding.  The model begins with Air Force Space Command’s (AFSPC) identification of 
a desired space capability early in the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System 
(JCIDS) process through system development at Milestone-C (MS-C) of the acquisition system 
resulting in a probabilistic schedule distribution for a given concept.  This model of the 
Department of Defense's (DoD) space capability development process provides decision making 
information for the Concept Characterization and Technical Description (CCTD) documents 
referenced during Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).  The research focused on identifying activities 
and assigning historical distributions and probabilities at each decision point.  Data was collected 
through analysis of applicable policy, instructions, and journal articles as well as interviews with 
subject matter experts (SME) from the Air Staff, AFSPC and the Space and Missile Systems 
Center (SMC).  ERAM will be initially utilized at Aerospace Corporation’s Los Angeles based 
space Concept Design Center (CDC) providing decision-makers insight into timeline estimations 
and probabilities of program success for various technical concepts based on historical 
comparisons. ERAM also has the potential to be used as a training tool for Air Staff, AFSPC and 
SMC personnel to better understand existing organizational interdependencies and required 
processes necessary to acquire a capability on schedule and within budget.  
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I. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 The United States DoD’s global military dominance has been achieved in part by its 
ability to maintain a technological advantage over its adversaries.  As research and development 
efforts discover new technologies and potential military applications, three systems, the DoD 
JCIDS system, the Program, Planning, Budget and Execution (PPB&E) system and the 
acquisition system, function simultaneously and dependently on one another to continue 
evolving US military capabilities.  This complex “system of systems” is governed by numerous 
statutes, policies, instructions and guides that establish a process framework outlining the 
activities involved and how they relate to one another. It requires significant experience, 
education and initiative to understand and successfully navigate the system as a requirements or 
acquisition professional.  DoD weapon systems have significantly increased in complexity and 
interdependency in the past two decades with mandatory Key Performance Parameters (KPP) 
relating to net centricity, joint interoperability, as well as several others.  According to a 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, programs such as Transformational Satellite 
Communications System (TSAT) and Space Radar were “among the most complex programs 
ever undertaken” (Nelson and Sessions 2006).  DoD’s ability to deliver within original cost and 
schedule estimates has diminished.  In a GAO survey with an unspecified total number of MDAP 
PMs interviewed, “45 program managers (PM) responded that their program had been 
rebaselined one or more times for cost and schedule increases” (Nelson and Sessions 2006).  
Numerous senior DoD leaders have indicated that one of the reasons for this is due to insufficient 
and/or inaccurate data used to make early decisions to pursue material solutions; this recognition 
has placed new emphasis on improving early systems engineering analysis during  capability gap 
analysis and requirements generation, pre-Materiel Development Decision (MDD) activities, and 
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early acquisition activities pre MS-A.  President Barack Obama released the National Space 
Policy of the United States of America on June 28, 2010, and stated, “Departments and agencies 
shall: Improve timely acquisition and deployment of space systems through enhancements in 
estimating costs, technological risk and maturity, and industrial base capabilities” (Obama, 
National Space Policy of the United States of America 28 June 2010).  Secretary of Defense 
Gates made the following statement in his Defense Budget Recommendation Statement on 6 
April, 2010,  
… Second, we must ensure that requirements are reasonable and technology is 
adequately mature to allow the department to successfully execute the programs…Third, 
realistically estimate program costs, provide budget stability for the programs we initiate, 
adequately staff the government acquisition team, and provide disciplined and constant 
oversight (SECDEF 2009). 
 
In the Chief of Staff of the Air Force’s Vector dated 4 July, 2010, General Norton 
Schwartz’s fifth priority to recapture acquisition excellence states, “Ultimately, the health of the 
Air Force requires that we bring acquisition costs and timelines under much greater control and 
oversight.”  In an effort to accomplish this, he states we must “Recapture a vision for aggressive 
science and technology (S&T) development, the rapid transition of innovative technology into 
operational capabilities, and harnessing aerospace technology to meet broader national security 
needs” (Schwartz 2010).  In August, 2010, Lt Gen Shackelford (SAF/AQ) was the keynote 
speaker at the Air Force Systems Engineering conference and highlighted two specific 
challenges: the first addressed planning and “the lack of technical input to make informed 
decisions”.  The second focused on execution and stated that “technical issues/risks aren’t 
discovered and addressed at the right time and at the right level” (Shanley 2011). 
The President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense and senior Air Force 
officials have clearly recognized the need to improve the capability development, requirements 
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validation and acquisitions within the DoD and have issued strategic guidance to tackle the 
challenge (Obama 28 June 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates 6 Apr 2009, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force 2009).  One of the fundamental factors resulting in poor program 
performance is insufficient early systems engineering analysis and inaccurate Technology 
Readiness Assessments (TRA) in the requirements and acquisition systems.  This has inevitably 
resulted in early program decisions being made based upon poor cost and schedule estimates 
(Shanley 2011). 
In September, 2009, a doctoral dissertation, “Identifying Enterprise Leverage Points in 
Defense Acquisition Program Performance”, was published with the goal of characterizing the 
system of acquiring large, complex, socio-technological systems for the DoD (Wirthlin 2009).  
The research resulted in an in-depth analysis of the discrete events and products required for a 
typical aerospace defense program throughout the lifecycle, with emphasis placed on events 
prior to MS-C.  Data about the events and products was gathered through analysis of existing 
policy and guidance (pre 2006) as well as numerous interviews with defense acquisition experts.  
Subsequently, this data was modeled and programmed using the Arena® software modeling tool, 
resulting in the first-ever discrete-event simulation of the entire defense acquisition model, albeit 
abstracted at a high level.  For the purpose of this research, this version of the model will be 
referred to as the ERAM, version 1.0 (ERAM 1.0).  ERAM 1.0 simulated various activities and 
events using probabilities for decision event outcomes and timeline distributions to determine 
likely overall program timelines as well as probabilities of successful program execution up to 
MS-C.    The output is reflected by a probabilistic determination of likely program duration 
through approval of MS-C using Monte Carlo simulation techniques.  ERAM 1.0 modeled a 
capability concept or idea entering the Major Command (MAJCOM) requirements process and 
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simulated its path to termination.  Additional implementation included decision points 
throughout the process flow to include determination of a successful design review, rework, 
funding checks and other events.  The activities for discrete events incorporated triangular 
distributions for elapsed times.  For example, timelines associated with affordability assessments, 
preparing for reviews, writing documents, all had probability distributions with a best case, worst 
case and most likely number of days, with the data elicited from various sources.  These 
sequences of events with timeline probabilities and decision points as executed through the 
simulation delivered results enabling further analysis for decision-making.  Accordingly, with 
additional refinement and enhancements this model has the potential to be used as a valuable 
data source for decision makers in forecasting a program’s development and delivery schedules 
and life cycle costs (Wirthlin 2009).  
In the Fall of 2010, the SMC, Development Planning branch (SMC/XR) sponsored 
further research and analysis on ERAM 1.0, focusing specifically on early space requirements 
and acquisition activities pre MS B (Figure 1).  The model will be updated and enhanced to 
address these issues specifically. 
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Figure 1: Requirements Generation Process (CJCS 2011) 
Research data was collected through a series of interviews with space requirements and 
acquisition personnel from AFSPC Requirements directorate (AFSPC/A5), the Under Secretary 
of the Air Force, Acquisitions Science, Technology and Engineering (SAF/AQR) division and 
space acquisition program managers coupled with an analysis of updated requirements and 
acquisition guidance.  The research approach resulted in several updated model versions, ERAM 
1.1, 1.2, 2.0 and 2.1, highlighted and explained in Figure 2 and Table 1.   
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Figure 2: ERAM Evolution 
 
Table 1: ERAM Versions 
 
First, ERAM 1.0 was ported to the ExtendSim® modeling software to support the installed 
software base of the sponsor.  It then went through the iterations as mentioned in Table 1.  
The main research focus spans ERAM 1.2 through ERAM 2.1 by making ERAM current 
with recent DoD Instruction 5000.02 (DoDI) updates and expanding the pre MS-B JCIDS 
processes to show how Development Planning (DP) and CCTD processes are integrated into the 
Model 
Version 
Description 
ERAM 1.0 Original model developed and published in Wirthlin’s dissertation 
ERAM 1.1 Incorporated updated changes from Arena® and port to ExtendSim© software 
ERAM 1.2 Incorporated changes from DoDI 5000.02 May 2003 version to Dec 2008 version 
ERAM 2.0 Incorporated model parameter adjustments to capability (i.e. SPO capability 
matrix) 
ERAM 2.1 Incorporates early requirements development activities from JCIDS 
DECISION 
AID: 
Acq 
Timeline 
Forecast
Acq 
Resource 
Planning
2008 2011
Inputs:
DoD 5000.2
JCIDS
PPBE
TRL
Heritage
Real-World 
Experience
Update:
SMC Sponsored:
-Updated Guidance/Surveys
- Space Acquisition Focus
- DoD 5000
- JCIDS
Wirthlin’s PhD Dissertation
- General Acquisition Focus
ENTERPRISE REQUIREMENTS  AND ACQUISITION MODEL (ERAM) 
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
ERAM 1.0 ERAM 2.1
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process of developing a new capability.  The research found capabilities desired by the AFSPC 
can typically be categorized as either “evolutionary” or “revolutionary”.  Evolutionary 
capabilities are achieved through modification(s) or upgrade(s) to an existing system(s).  In these 
instances, AFSPC performs its JCIDS requirements process and may reach back to the product 
center’s system(s) program offices (SPO) for their DP.  On the other hand, revolutionary 
capabilities are typically those that require the development of an entirely new system.  For these 
DP activities, AFSPC reaches out to subject matter experts (SME) at SMC/XR.  These 
revolutionary capabilities have the potential of moving out of SMC/XR and into a new SPO.  
Additionally, the research made inquiries into deviations from existing policy and methods of 
approval for these deviations.   This served as a way to enrich the realism of the model’s and 
subsequently, its usefulness for decision makers.   
1.2 Problem Statement 
President Obama states in the National Security Strategy for the United States of 
America,  
Cost-effective and efficient processes are particularly important for the DoD, which 
accounts for approximately 70 percent of all Federal procurement spending. We will 
scrutinize our programs and terminate or restructure those that are outdated, duplicative, 
ineffective, or wasteful. The result will be more relevant, capable, and effective programs 
and systems that our military wants and needs (Obama, National Security Strategy 2010). 
 
Furthermore, from the National Defense Strategy (June 2008), Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates states, “We also must continue to improve our acquisition and contracting regulations, 
procedures, and oversight to ensure agile and timely procurement of critical equipment and 
materials for our forces” (Gates, National Defense Strategy 2008). 
Senior leader decisions with regards to future space programs must be based upon 
realistic and accurate cost and schedule estimates which historically have not existed.  Sadly, 
cost overruns and schedule delays have become the norm in space acquisitions.  National defense 
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leadership has emphasized the importance of continuing to expand our role in space as well as 
increasing space capabilities in a costly and timely manner.  Currently, there is no existing 
capability or process to quickly and comprehensively develop the requirements and acquisition 
program details for large and complex space systems.  According to Dr. Peter Hantos and Nancy 
Kern of the Aerospace Corporation, “Pre MS-A Systems Engineering and Pre MS-B Software 
Engineering efforts are not comprehended in any estimation models” (Hantos and Kern 2011). 
1.3 Implications 
The primary purpose of this research was to update and modify ERAM 1.0 to ERAM 2.1 
for SMC/XR to utilize as a tool to increase the fidelity of CCTDs.  By improving the quality and 
viability of the data within these documents, Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) decisions 
regarding future space capabilities will be based on more accurate cost and schedule estimates 
resulting in decreased breaches and improved program performance. 
 Additionally, there are several other important implications that modeling the 
requirements and acquisition process delivers.  ERAM in conjunction with this comprehensive 
report can aid requirements and acquisition professionals to better understand organizational 
relationships and provide a map of required activities based upon current directives and 
guidance, improving the likelihood of successfully maintaining program cost, schedule and 
performance objectives.  The model could also help OSD and SAF personnel identify 
inefficiencies and disconnects within the vast number of current instructions, resulting in 
modification and simplification of current guidance.  ERAM also provides detailed context to the 
well known, but too often incomprehensible, DAU acquisition “wall chart.”  This chart provides 
a high level picture of acquisition activities, but, lacks detail to effectively train acquisition 
professionals.  By supplementing the “wall chart” with the ERAM framework, real world data 
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can significantly improve the current training curriculum for acquisition personnel— possibly 
resulting in a “flight simulator” of the acquisition system.  This training device could evolve into 
a more disciplined and rigorous training & evaluation system for acquisition personnel. 
 Chapter II (Literature Review) of this report will provide an overview of the key 
documents that heavily influenced the development of ERAM 1.2 through 2.1 and the findings 
included in this report. Chapter III (Methodology) describes the methods used to collect the data 
necessary to accurately update ERAM.  Furthermore, it highlights the methodology for the 
research accomplished through interviews of subject matter experts and processes for making 
updates to the software model.  Chapter IV (Results and Analysis) will consolidate the findings 
from the interviews and discuss how they were implemented into the model.  Chapter V 
(Conclusions and Recommendations) summarizes the findings of this research effort and 
provides recommendations on additional research and policy changes that would benefit space 
acquisitions.    
10 
 
II. Literature Review 
Research on the subject of DoD capability development required the review of more than 
50 policy documents, official instructions, guidance, journal articles, and briefings.  Table 2 
highlights the eight major resources that are the seminal pieces of literature for this research.  
They were utilized to capture the essence of the space acquisition and requirements themes for 
making modeling decisions and acquisition observations for this research effort.  However, these 
are but a small snapshot of the policy requirements that acquisition professionals will need to 
quickly process and internalize in order to develop requirements and acquisition program details 
for complex space systems.  Wirthlin’s dissertation (Resource #1 below) provides the foundation 
of this modeling effort.  The remainder provides significant guidance in the ever-changing world 
of acquisition.  Each of these resources is intended to aid in the background required for inputs 
into ERAM development.  The foundation of Wirthlin’s dissertation and the additional guidance 
provided in the literature review serve as the basis for the information which can be utilized for 
improved decision-making and closing the gap in acquisition knowledge.  More details about 
each resource follow. 
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Table 2: Highlighted Literature Overview 
  Resource 
1) Wirthlin, J. Robert.  Identifying Enterprise Leverage Points in Defense Acquisition 
Program Performance.   
2) Gates, Robert M.  SECDEF MEMO.  Department of Defense Efficiency Initiatives.  
16 Aug 2010. 
3) Carter, Ashton B.  USD/AT&L MEMO for Acquisition Professionals: Better Buying 
Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense 
Spending. 14 Sep 2010.  
4) Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) Early Systems 
Engineering Guidebook Version 1.   
5) Loren, Jeff C (SAF/AQRE).  The ABCs of Concept Evolution: A Better-Informed 
Materiel Development Decision for USAF Programs.  18 Nov 2010 
6) United States of America Congress.  Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act 
(WSARA) of 2009    
7) Acquisition Improvement Plan (AIP) 4 May 2009 
8) Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-025 – Space Systems Acquisition Policy 
(SSAP) 
 
Resource #1: Identifying Enterprise Leverage Points in Defense Acquisition Program  
          Performance 
 Wirthlin’s PhD dissertation simulated the acquisition “wall chart” using the Arena® 
software tool.  It provides a thorough background of the acquisition process, the PPBE process, 
and the JCIDs process.  Through reviewing literature and interviewing members of the DoD 
requirements and acquisition communities, this dissertation provides a candid view of many of 
the challenges and opportunities to bring an acquisition program to MS-C.    
The fundamental research questions in the dissertation were the following: “How does 
the acquisition system work?”  A follow up question was, “Why does the system behave the way 
12 
 
that it does?”  And finally, “Are there things that can be done to improve the system?” (Wirthlin 
2009)  Throughout the dissertation and model development, real world detailed examples were 
given on not only how the acquisition process should work according to policy and guidance, but 
also how MAJCOMs, Air Staff, or SPO personnel personalized the system to be more effective 
within their own areas of responsibility.  ERAM 1.0, as developed in the Arena® simulation 
program, captured process steps, activities, and injected uncertainty to show additional realism.  
Although it captured various elements as discrete events, these were modeled with a triangular 
distribution of the number of days required to complete.  Inputs to these discrete event activities 
were minimum, maximum and most likely number of days based on a user’s actual experience 
and estimates.  Alternative paths through the system or branching points were also identified 
with associated probabilities.   For example, one branching point was during a source selection.  
The probability of receiving a protest from a losing contractor was identified as 20%.  ERAM 1.0 
captured this probability and added an activity to account for the protest event.   
ERAM 1.0 represents a predictive model of various detailed elements of the acquisition 
processes with their timelines and interdependencies along with several exploratory variants that 
include: Air Staff intervention; MAJCOM approval body(s) intervention; technical interventions; 
interventions at different design reviews; funding stability; etc.   By exploring these variants, and 
combining these adjustments over acquisition category (ACAT) I, II, and III level programs, 
conclusions were drawn regarding ways to improve program outcomes.  An identical analysis 
approach will also be used in this new research by focusing on the SMC/XR processes in the 
development planning phase of acquisition.   
The “meat” of the dissertation was certainly ERAM 1.0, its development, its results, and 
the verification and validation.  The printed version of ERAM 1.0 in a readable format takes a 
13 
 
roll of butcher block paper approximately 14 feet long.  The main outputs include: where the 
process was terminated; the probability of reaching the exit points, and the number of days 
required to complete the process through MS-C and other areas.  A concept or idea enters the 
model at the requirements shop.  The exact method for a concept entering the requirements 
process is not specifically modeled in ERAM 1.0.  It assumes an idea is introduced to the 
requirements organization and then proceeds forward.  This is then carried forward and either 
terminates at various points along ERAM 1.0, or reaches MS-C.  Innovative methods to account 
for the various unplanned taskings levied on a program were modeled using uncertainty events at 
a regular frequency.   
Uncertainty driven by political circumstances is artificially modeled by randomly 
generating a ‘program review’ where the finances, program management and other 
aspects of a program are ‘reviewed’ for potential cuts and/or changes.  A set driver of 
uncertainty, also artificially driven, is named simply ‘event happens’ and is used to 
account for the stochastic nature of problems encountered in the execution of the 
development program, running the gamut from the impacts of ‘known unknowns’ to 
“unknown unknowns” (Wirthlin 2009).    
 
Examples of these uncertain events could include some tasking from Air Staff to write a point 
paper defending their acquisition strategy.  This is an out-of-cycle activity levied on the PM, 
which may or may not happen.  So therefore, each “uncertainty event” captured the possibility of 
an unplanned activity path.   
The dissertation and ERAM 1.0 lays the groundwork for observers to take a hard look at 
how policy changes impact the acquisition process.  The insight gained from inserting realism 
into the acquisition “wall chart” or “horse blanket” can be enlightening to those wishing to 
understand the impact of certain decisions on the overall outcome of a program.  The analogy of 
the “butterfly effect” is that a butterfly flapping its wings at one location could potentially create 
a major windstorm at another location.  A small tweak to the acquisition process could have a 
14 
 
major impact to the outcome.  It  has the potential to aid decision makers to understand how to 
resource their programs, provide more realistic expectations on program timelines, and in the 
future, provide “knobs” where critical process/program parameters could be modified to improve 
overall outcomes (sensitivity analysis).   A high-level view of this model is found in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: ERAM 1.0 Arena (Wirthlin 2009) 
 
Resource #2: Department of Defense Efficiency Initiatives 
Secretary of Defense Gates provided direction for eliminating excess costs in the DoD 
budget in a memo issued 16 August 2010.  These efficiencies are intended to align the Defense 
budget with the overall intent to reduce the size of the federal budget.   Some of these 
efficiencies include: “10% reduction in funding for service support contractors”; freezing the 
number of staff billets at several agencies including Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); 
25% reduction in advisory studies; eliminate Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks & 
Information Integration (ASD/NII) and J6 organizations; and “complete a comprehensive review 
of all Department-required oversight reports with the aim of reducing the volume by eliminating 
non-essential requirements”  (OUSD/ATL 2010).  This impacts the acquisition process in several 
ways such as extending activity timelines with a less experienced and minimally staffed 
workforce.  Additionally, future iterations of the model could have activities eliminated if they 
are considered to be surplus oversight requirements.  These efficiencies have the potential to 
provide benefit in reduced bureaucracy and an improvement in the ability of acquisition 
professionals to understand the requirements levied on them.   All of these must be captured in 
ERAM. 
Resource #3: Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity  
          in Defense Spending 
This letter also provides several key directives to redirect $100B in defense spending by 
improving business practices and cutting lower priority spending initiatives.  Secretary Carter 
stated: “To put it bluntly: we have a continuing responsibility to procure the critical goods and 
services our forces need in the years ahead, but we will not have ever-increasing budgets to pay 
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for them.  We must therefore strive to achieve what economists call productivity growth: in 
simple terms, to DO MORE WITHOUT MORE.”  (Carter 2010)   Some key elements include 
the following: 1) At MS-A, the acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) will include 
affordability as a Key Performance Parameter (KPP);  2) Eliminate redundancies within 
portfolios; 3) Competitive Strategy required at all milestones; 4) Further insight into contractors 
Independent Research and Development (IRAD) investments; 5) Modify Nunn-McCurdy rules 
for special situations; etc.  The independent cost estimates (ICE) will now be used to drive 
productivity into the programs and provide incentives.   There will now be “should cost” and 
“will cost” estimates.  Previously, only the “will cost” estimates were used.  The “should cost” 
estimates will now be inserted into the process to incentivize leanness and efficiencies by the 
PM.  If prices are negotiated less than the “will cost” and the program is executed as such, cost 
savings could be reallocated within programs to acquire other capabilities.   
“The metric of success for Should Cost management leading to annual productivity 
increases is annual savings of a few percent from all our ongoing contracted activities as 
they execute to a lower figure than budgeted.  Industry can succeed in this environment 
because we will tie better performance to higher profit, and because affordable programs 
will not face cancellation.”  (Carter 2010) 
 
Cost estimates through OSD will impact program flows and timelines.  These cost drivers impact 
program timelines in the modeling and analysis as the OSD governing body for cost estimates 
adds additional checks and balance in the early systems engineering process.  A fair criticism of 
space programs would be that the “will cost” estimates were not achieved suggesting the notion 
of “should cost” estimates as being without merit.  However, with the added emphasis on cost 
estimation with more defined processes, the “should cost” will be a driving force in future 
acquisitions programs.  Further research will determine if this new emphasis achieved its desired 
goals.  As acquisition professionals are given the knowledge tools to execute their programs, 
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they will be empowered to successfully navigate through the information and succeed.  These 
must be accounted for and captured in ERAM. 
Resource #4: Early Systems Engineering Guidebook 
This guidebook is critical for this research project as it discusses the “meat” of the 
acquisition process prior to MS-A.  It discusses the Capability Based Assessment (CBA), 
Concept Exploration and Refinement, AoA, the CCTD document, and the Materiel Solution 
Analysis phase.  
“A development and acquisition organization, typically XR, responsible for translating 
high-level system needs into more detailed system-level information. With the help of all 
stakeholders, they generate and analyze alternative system concepts, and provide 
balanced estimates of effectiveness, performance, cost, schedule, and risk to assist the 
stakeholders in selecting preferred concepts” (SAF/AQ 2009).   
 
 
Figure 4: Early Systems Engineering Process (SAF/AQ 2009) 
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Figure 4 highlights the system engineering “V” with the associated organizational impacts 
throughout the process.  Thorough early systems engineering efforts have the potential to close 
knowledge gaps.  These CCTD processes are recommended as updates to ERAM in Version 2.1.  
Resource #5: The ABCs of Concept Evolution: A Better-Informed Materiel Development  
          Decision for USAF Programs 
The Concept Initiation briefing addresses the MDD leading up to MS-A.  It addresses the 
relationships between systems engineering, DP, S&T, and the CCTD.   It acknowledges changes 
to the JCIDS that eliminated the Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) and the Analysis of 
Material Alternatives (AMA) but the knowledge resulting from these types of studies is still 
required to support MDDs and MS-As.  It discusses a paradigm shift where the shift is from 
technology focus to capability focus.  Early systems engineering is critical to transform the 
technology into meeting a capability gap.  CCTDs are becoming a critical element of the early 
systems engineering process to support MDDs and AoAs.  (Loren 2010)  Early systems 
engineering as updated in the model has the potential to impact later impacts to the process.  
Understanding these early system engineering impacts may reduce overall program cost as 
decision makers have the necessary knowledge.  These references and activities need to be 
incorporated into ERAM. 
Resource #6: Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act 
WSARA updates Title 10 of the US Code in several areas to improve the acquisition 
process in DoD.  For example, to improve the cost estimates for major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAP), a Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) is directed 
to place an improved emphasis on cost estimation.  Other events impacting the model include 
competitive prototyping requirements which impact acquisition and contracting strategies.  This 
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is related to the new adjustments to DoDI 5000.02 policy (US Congress 2009).  Additional 
oversight has the potential to provide more accurate cost estimates with less of an impact for cost 
growth and program breaches.  Although these cost estimates may add time early in the process, 
the PMs may have a more accurate assessment of their program  This would potentially reduce 
later program inquiries from Congress or Headquarters personnel.  More accurate program cost 
estimates aid in closing knowledge gaps for acquisition professionals.  ERAM needs to explicitly 
model these changes and impacts. 
Resource #7: Acquisition Improvement Plan 
 As a follow-up to WSARA, the Air Force made a commitment to improve various 
acquisition processes based on lessons learned from past acquisition programs with negative 
outcomes.  Secretary Donley and General Schwartz stated: “This plan focuses our efforts and 
will serve as our strategic framework for the critical work of modernizing and recapitalizing our 
air, space and cyber systems” (SAF/AQ 2009).  One of the goals is to improve the core 
workforce in the acquisition community.  “To operate effectively, today’s acquisition workforce 
must be supported by a human resource environment that recognizes the complexity of the 
acquisition mission and grooms professional journeyman as well as future leaders in all of the 
acquisition functional specialties”  (SAF/AQ 2009).  This is especially true as this research 
reports on observations by key personnel in the acquisition community on the requirements for 
knowledgeable team members.  Additionally, this document identifies the need to improve the 
requirements generation process.  “In the future, there will be acquisition involvement earlier in 
the Air Force requirements and development process and systems engineering techniques will be 
applied to assist in the tradeoffs that occur as part of the process”  (SAF/AQ 2009).  The key to 
this is in ensuring the constant collaboration with Headquarters, lead commands, and acquisition 
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program offices.   These interpersonal relationships and collaboration will aid PMs to internalize 
all of the required information.  Such changes will need to be accommodated in ERAM.   
Resource #8: Space Systems Acquisition Policy 
Ashton Carter, USD/AT&L, directed specific acquisition procedures for space programs.  
Some of these activities go above and beyond the standard DoDI 5000.02 guidance and impact 
the modeling development efforts in this research.   
“The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) shall conduct a formal program assessment 
following the System Design Review (SDR) for space systems. The SDR provides an 
opportunity to assess satisfaction of user needs through functional decomposition and 
traceability of requirements from the initial capabilities document (ICD) to the contractor’s 
functional baseline and system specification. An Independent Program Assessment (IPA) 
shall be provided to support the Pre-System Design Review Assessment (P-SDRA).”  (Carter 
2010)   
 
These post review assessments with the MDA, to include optional IPA support, add 
activities with timeline distributions to the model.  More importantly they impact the actual 
execution requirements levied on a SPO.  This information is significant to this research as it 
modifies the DoDI 5000.02 guidelines specific to space programs.  PMs are required to be 
prepared for these multiple MDA looks which are above and beyond standard MDA reviews.   
Summary  
 
 This literature review demonstrates the ever-changing pockets of guidance and 
knowledge levied on acquisition professionals within DoD.  All of the policy changes are 
intended to improve program execution.  However, the number of policies and their frequency of 
change levy vast knowledge and training requirements.  Wirthlin’s dissertation showed the 
complexity of the knowledge network PMs are required to distill into something executable.  
Several policy documents and memos in this review showed the many nuances in oversight 
required at various stages in the process.  Others attempt efficiency improvements in acquisition.  
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Early systems engineering was identified as a critical element in program improvement.  
Ultimately, all of these elements show areas where acquisition professionals need to quickly 
understand requirements and acquisition program details for complex space programs.  
Incorporating and addressing these elements in ERAM fills an important knowledge gap for both 
the researcher and practitioner of weapon system acquisition.   
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III. Methodology 
The research team performed qualitative social science research with the objective of 
building and refining an existing quantitative discrete event simulation model to be utilized by 
SMC and SPO XR branches as a decision support tool during early concept analysis.   
3.1 Research Scope 
 The focus of this research is to analyze and model the discrete events for Air Force space 
programs from capability gap analysis through MS-C of the acquisition system, more 
specifically, the early front-end area of capability gap analysis, requirements validation, DP and 
early acquisition.  Focusing on the front end of ERAM 1.0 limited the literature reviews and key 
personnel interviews to OSD, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (OSD/AT&L), Secretary of 
the Air Force, Acquisitions (SAF/AQ), AFSPC, SMC, the Aerospace Corporation and 
government support contractors.  Although some of the discussion with key requirements 
personnel included the cyber and information technology (IT) domain, the modeling 
implementation remained focused on space capability requirements and programs.   
 The PPB&E and Test and Evaluation (T&E) processes were not expanded beyond what 
was previously developed in ERAM 1.0.  PPB&E is the calendar driven funding process; the 
detailed formal budgeting process will be a topic left to future research to increase the fidelity of 
ERAM.  Certain elements in the model have incorporated checks for available funding, ICE, and 
above-threshold cost increases, however, do not identify the specific activities and decision 
points as well as their duration distributions and probabilities, respectively.   Uncertainty events 
which occur in the model may have ties to budget directives and decisions and will be based on 
out-of-cycle budget cut drills and other events gleaned from ERAM 1.0 
 Similarly, analysis of the T&E activities identified in ERAM 1.0 was not included in the 
scope of this research.  Since it is such a critical and timely activity in any capability 
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development, this is a prime topic for additional research, e.g. identify, document and update 
ERAM with the differences between aerospace and space T&E activities. 
3.2 Research Objectives 
At the beginning of the research effort, the following objectives were identified and agreed 
upon by both the customer (SMC/XR) as well as the research team (AFIT/ENV). 
1) Review and update ERAM 1.0 (predominantly focused on post MS-B activities and 
generalized USAF acquisition processes) to ERAM 2.1 for space programs.  These include: 
a. Implement corrections identified when transferring the model from Arena® to 
ExtendSim© modeling software (ERAM 1.1) 
b. Ensure updated DoDI 5000.02 representation and acquisition system processes 
(ERAM 1.2) 
c. Incorporate modeling parameter knobs to adjust certain model sensitivities, e.g. a 
SPO Experience matrix, ACAT, and technology readiness levels (TRL) (ERAM 2.0) 
d. Research and reflect, where applicable, capability gap analysis, JCIDS, and DP 
processes (ERAM 2.1) 
2) Validate utility of the model and how it can be used in existing early requirements and 
acquisition processes 
3) Identify additional research requirements for future versions of ERAM 
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3.3 Methodology 
In order to achieve the objectives of this research, a five phase approach was established 
and is illustrated in Figure 5.   
 
Figure 5: Group Research Project (GRP) Phased Approach 
3.3.1 Phase 1 
The first step was to review statutes, official DoD and Air Force regulations, instructions, 
guides and publications as well as applicable journal articles and research papers.  Figures 6 and 
7 provide a glimpse into the complexity and interdependencies of the policies and instructions. 
 
PHASE 1:
Information 
collection & review
PHASE 2:
ERAM 1.0 analysis
PHASE 3:
Identify and design updates to ERAM 1.0
PHASE 4:
Implement updates to develop ERAM 1.1, 1.2, 2.0 and 2.1
PHASE 5:
Report and brief findings
Familiarize with ERAM 1.0 in Arena®
Review ERAM 1.0 in ExtendSim® (model by Aerospace Corp.)
Design ERAM 1.1, 1.2, 2.0 and 2.1 by applying 
information from Phase 1 to ExtendSim© ERAM 1.0
Implement design changes in 
ExtendSim© to develop new ERAM 
versions
Write final report of 
findings and brief
Review policy, memorandums, instructions, guides, journal/research pubs 
relating to capability development, requirements validation & acquisitions
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Figure 6: Ops/Ops Support/T&E (SMC/SLX 2011) 
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Figure 7: Acq/Eng/Sustainment Mngt/Quality (SMC/SLX 2011) 
There are a significant number of references that establish the framework for how to develop 
and deliver new space capabilities.  Figure 8 represents the primary sources of policy 
information utilized in this research effort, a subset of instructions from Figures 6 and 7, and 
what portion of the “system” they are most closely related to (vertical alignment).  The challenge 
was identify the linkages between the activities and the various decision points that occur 
between capability gap analysis, requirement validation, DP, S&T activities and executing the 
acquisition. 
27 
 
 
Figure 8: Pedigree of Guidance for Space Capability Development 
The second step of phase one was to conduct interviews with SMEs familiar with capability 
gap analysis, requirements development and the acquisition process.  These were semi-structured 
interviews using purposeful and snowball sampling.  Purposeful sampling identified known 
SMEs (military, government civilians, Federally Funded Research & Development Contract 
personnel and support contractors) from SMC, AFSPC and SAF/AQ, each of which had 
significant experience in the acquisition and requirements career fields.  The interviews provided 
a perspective from where the policy makers and senior leaders are most likely to impact 
timelines and coordination cycles on required acquisition documentation. “In sociology and 
statistics research, snowball sampling is a technique for developing a research sample where 
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existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances” (Castillo 2009). 
Through the course of the interviews, additional names of SMEs were provided that could help 
answer specific questions regarding activities in several of the phases of the capabilities 
development system.  Some of the questions asked include the following: 
1) Describe what processes you’ve been involved with regards to space capability 
development (i.e. gap analysis, S&T, JCIDS documents, DP, and/or acquisitions) and 
with which program 
 
2) Describe the specific activities and decision points for the processes you’ve been 
involved in from question 1. 
 
3) What reviews and documentation were required for your program? 
The complete list of representative questions can be found in Appendix C.   
3.3.2 Phase 2 
After completing phase one, the next step was to verify the current baseline program, ERAM 
1.0, had been transferred correctly from Arena®  to ExtendSim® software.  Feedback was 
provided to SMC/XR’s Aerospace software engineers with any discrepancies or recommended 
updates identified.  The primary reason for transferring the system to ExtendSim® was to lower 
overall distribution costs; licensing for a wider distribution of Arena® versions of the modeling 
software would be cost prohibitive.   
In addition to familiarizing themselves with ERAM 1.0 in ExtendSim®, the research team 
reviewed the associated doctoral dissertation, “Identifying Leverage Points in Defense 
Acquisition Program Performance” and met with the author on a regular basis to better 
comprehend the methodology used to create the ERAM 1.0 framework.  The research team also 
participated in frequent meetings with the SMC/XR Aerospace team that implemented the 
ExtendSim® version of the model.  A hardcopy of the ERAM 1.0 was printed out to help 
facilitate visualization of the process; it requires 9 large butcher paper sheets pasted together to 
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form a single picture, as shown in the photograph in Figure 9 (the ninth page is behind Major 
Leach).   
 
Figure 9: ERAM 1.0 Printout 
In meetings with the Aerospace implementation team in Los Angeles, the printout was 
displayed in several locations to clarify portions of the model and identify where the various 
corrections and updates would occur.  These updates would include developing the model 
triggers identified as an output of the AFSPC Integrated Planning Process (IPP), the JCIDS 
document development activities and DoDI 5000.02 activities.   Figure 10 is an example of one 
portion of ERAM close up to see individual elements.   
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Figure 10: ERAM 1.0 Close Up View 
 
 For purposes of this discussion, five of the many ExtendSim® icons are described and 
illustrated in Figure 11.  The “Event/Activity” icon is implemented with a time duration allowing 
a distribution to be selected.  For this research, triangular distributions were implemented based 
on the data elicited from personnel.  The “And Merge With Wait” waits for all the inputs to 
arrive before proceeding to the next event.  The “Or” icon uses Boolean logic to proceed if either 
of the inputs occur.  The “Decision Point” output is based on the likelihood of an event to occur.  
The probabilities of each event are entered into the properties of the icon.   
{...}

ACAT Lev el
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Complete predecessor activ  preB
[1890]
Bring 3 processes together PreB
[2336]
[2740]
SDR submodel
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{...}
Kill Time = 0
Kill Location = 51
DB[4150]
Time
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Program Kill at SDR
{...}
Kill Time = 0
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Time
[3226]
{...}
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DB[4336]
Program Kill at PDR
Time
[4337] Program Kill at IPA
Space Specif ic
[3299]
What If
[3327]
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Kill Time = 0
Kill Location = 54
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Time
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Figure 11: ExtendSim Icons 
3.3.3 Phase 3 
The third phase focused on determining how to update ExtendSim® software code from 
ERAM 1.0 in order to develop the coding implementation plans for ERAM 1.1, 1.2, 2.0 and 2.1.  
The research team identified required updates in collaboration with the SMC/XR Aerospace 
team by providing model design inputs via Microsoft Visio diagrams, Microsoft Word 
documents, teleconferences, in person meetings, plain text and ExtendSim® drawings. 
For ERAM 1.1, while transferring the model from Arena® to ExtendSim©, the Aerospace 
Corporation and the research team identified several portions of the model (specific activities) 
that didn’t apply to space requirements and acquisitions or activities that hadn’t been included.  
Recommended coding changes were diagramed and validated by referencing the sources 
reviewed in phase one.   
ExtendSim Icon Function Name
Event/Activity
And Merge with Wait
Or
DecisionPoint
Submodel
D F
Clinger-Cohen Assess/Cert
[4364]
Bring 3 processes together PreB
[2336]
[3184][4]
    0.9
    0.1
SDR 2
[4317][39]
PDR submodel
[3657]
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ERAM 1.2 design updates were identified by analyzing the updates that occurred between 
the March 2003 and December 2008 versions of the DoDI 5000.02.  Additionally, design 
updates incorporating guidance from the DTM 09-025 SSAP were included.  
ERAM 2.0 further improved the fidelity of the model by establishing parameters for the 
model that would adjust the outputs.  Essentially, these are the settings or “knobs” that can be 
changed prior to running the model and include factors such as SPO Experience Level, ACAT 
level (for space programs, almost always ACAT-1D), TRL and what JCIDS documents may or 
may not exist.  To model the human factors influence on a program, a SPO Experience Matrix 
was created that included acquisition experience level, resource availability, staff experience, 
external program support, etc.  The user input of this matrix globally impacted certain ERAM 
activity distributions.  The details of this will be discussed further in Chapter IV.     
The final version, ERAM 2.1, incorporated the largest software update.  This increased the 
fidelity of ERAM 1.0 by identifying and incorporating the activities that occur early in the 
capability development, to include user-selected JCIDS concepts options (following output of 
AFSPC IPP e.g. paper concept, Advanced Technology Demo (ATD), Joint Urgent Operational 
Need (JUON, others), as well as JCIDS and DP activities preceding MDD.  Information for this 
update was gleaned from Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 3170.01G (CJCSI 
3170.01G), CCTD Guide, the AoA Guide, Early Systems Engineering Guide and Pre-MDD 
Handbooks as well as through iterative discussions with SMEs located at AFSPC/A5 and 
SAF/AQRE.  Document reviews guided the first draft of an activity diagram representing the 
flow of the early activities.  Subsequent iterations of the diagram were updated based on 
feedback from AFSPC/A5 and SAF/AQ SMEs to validate the activity flow.  Additionally, the 
SMEs assisted in defining timelines for activities within the model for most likely, worst and 
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best case timelines for the activities as well as the decision point probabilities based on historical 
experience.  Another valuable source of data was the Requirements and Management Plan 
(RAMP) initiative developed by AFSPC.  This was a recently developed work breakdown 
structure (WBS) that identified all activities at AFSPC/A5 and was a useful tool for identifying 
best case timelines or policy-directed timelines for various discrete events within the JCIDS and 
acquisition processes.  The AF/A5 website was also referenced and provided estimated 
coordination and approval timelines for achieving a Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC) approved ICD.   
3.3.4 Phase 4   
This phase involved implementing the ExtendSim® code design changes developed in 
phase three by leveraging an established collaborative working relationship between the research 
team and the SMC/XR Aerospace software engineers.  With the required design changes 
developed in the previous phase, the software engineers made the necessary programming 
changes to ERAM 1.0.  Various interactions and follow-up conversations were made to clarify 
programming inputs.  After clarifying certain aspects of the code, the teams collaborated to 
provide one another feedback.  When code was implemented, it was released for review with 
clarification questions.  The research team answered the appropriate inquiries based upon policy, 
guidance, and interview notes. 
3.3.5 Phase 5 
At the conclusion of the effort of the first four phases, the results were captured in this 
research report.  It includes notes from the interviews, information from the policy documents, 
elements of the programming code as well as general observations/opinions about space 
capability development.  During the interviews, the researchers took notes, transcribed them, and 
then coded them or extracted common themes to incorporate into the report.  Additionally, the 
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literature review revealed other pertinent themes which were then incorporated.  Results of the 
programming updates were included in their appropriate sections.   
Another aspect of the research included reviews of other acquisition modeling activities.  In 
the socialization of this research with various organizations, similar but not duplicate modeling 
efforts were discovered some of which were inspired by the methodology used by Wirthlin 
(2009).  Many of the different developments were not known by the other parties.  The following 
models and/or tools were reviewed: 1) Acquisition Process Model (APM) 
(http://acpo.crethq.com/acpo.htm); 2) Acquisition Document Development and Management 
(ADDM); and 3) RAMP.    Further discussion of these is in Chapter V. 
3.4 Assumptions 
Development of space based technologies is outlined in the AFSPC Instruction 61-101 
(AFSPCI 61-101), Space S&T Management (18 October 2007).  This instruction documents the 
process of identifying and prioritizing which space science and technologies are worthy of 
investment in order to reach future strategic objectives and is executed through the AFSPC IPP.  
Figure 12 provides a summary of the activities flows of this process. 
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Figure 12: Major S&T Process Elements (AFSPC 2007) 
Since the IPP is continually evaluating and selectively funding specific S&T activities that 
support identified Mission Area Architecture gaps and occurs in advance of concept 
consideration, this was not included in ERAM.  It is a very important process, but doesn’t fall 
within the scope of the objectives of this research.   
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3.5 Limitations 
 Despite research efforts to identify all sequential/parallel activities that occur early in 
capability gap analysis through MS-C of a program and the decision probabilities at the various 
junctions, as with all models, there are limitations to ERAM.  Some of these are generic to all 
models while others are specific to ERAM.  For example, modeling personalities and human 
behaviors is extremely difficult.  Personalities can have a significant impact on interpersonal 
relationships which can have influence on the success of a program.  If the PM has a positive 
relationship with the MDA, the likelihood of a positive review may be higher.  This is highly 
subjective and a challenge to quantify in software code.   
1)  Generic modeling limitations include scope and schedule risks.   The number of all 
the events of the acquisition and requirements processes could lead to several thesis and 
dissertations to improve model robustness.  The researchers needed to limit the focus areas and 
allow for future research to continue improving ERAM.  The schedule for this project was 
bounded by immovable schedule deadlines.  Heldman notes: “When none of the constraints are 
negotiable—watch out” (Heldman 2005).  Therefore, the scope had to be clear and adjustable as 
deadlines grew near and understanding of the model increased.   
2) A significant common factor in all activities within capability analysis, requirement 
development/validation and executing the acquisition program is that all are heavily influenced 
by the personnel involved on the program.  This is the human factors element that is 
extraordinarily difficult to accurately capture in the model.  A sampling of these issues are 
identified in Table 3. 
 
 
 
37 
 
Table 3: Human Factors 
Human Factor Characteristic Impact 
Military Personnel Turnover ~2-4 years Loss of technical/contract/ 
program knowledge negatively 
impacting program 
Elected Officials Turnover ~2-4 years Funding, strategic prioritites 
Key Personnel Leadership/Management/ 
Interpersonal Relationships 
PM, CO, and JAG can each 
individually have drastic 
impacts on program 
performance 
Senior Leaders (OSD, MDA, 
PEO/SP, AFSPC/CC, 
AFSPC/A5, SAF/AQ) 
Turnover ~2-4 years Program priority resulting in 
change in available resources, 
sponsorship 
Govt support contractors Quality and Technical 
Competency 
Experience and qualifications 
can result in 
insufficient/inadequate 
program support 
Federally Funded Research & 
Development Center (FFRDC) 
Contractors 
Availability Insufficient technical support 
impedes government’s 
independent assessments 
Industry Personnel Management & Technical 
Performance 
Profit versus schedule and cost 
prioritization 
 
For instance, military personnel are rotating every 2-4 years.  Space programs can easily 
last ten to fifteen years, implying there will be a significant turnover at the SPO all the way up to 
DoD senior decision makers.  This turnover in personnel can be either very beneficial or 
detrimental to the original schedule, but, in either case adds significant variability to ERAM 
results.  Certain key personnel positions in the requirements and acquisition system can 
significantly influence ERAM outputs.  For example, in the acquisition system, the PM and 
contracting officers (CO) are critical positions to the execution of the program.  The PM position 
is competitively managed by Air Force Personnel Command (AFPC) as a Materiel Leader.  
Strict qualification requirements are levied and a board of senior Air Force officers selects from 
qualified candidates to fill the positions.  On the contrary, the CO is more often than not filled by 
who’s available at that location; they are essentially a high demand, low density Air Force asset.  
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The CO may or may not be technically competent or have past performance qualifications to 
successfully support the schedule and cost constraints of the program.   Common feedback from 
interviewed PMs was that a CO’s “can do” attitude or “can’t do” attitude can critically impact 
schedule objectives.  Additionally, the performance of industry personnel were difficult to 
model.  Depending on the profitability of a program, it may or may not have the “all-star” 
personnel assigned to it.   
ERAM 2.0 attempts to capture the impacts of these human factors by having a parameter 
that can be adjusted based upon the composition of the team.  However, this does not fully 
capture the variability that people contribute to the system.  The success or failure of a program 
is greatly impacted by the levels of education, motivation, acquisition experience, and 
personality of all team members, both on the government and industry teams.  The column 
headings below relate to the human factor indicators in Table 3 as they impact the variables in 
experience and qualifications of the program office team.   
Table 4: Acquisition Maturity Potential Matrix 
 
ERAM 2.0 adds a global variable of acquisition capability into ERAM 1.2.  Table 4 identifies 
areas where an ERAM user can identify the appropriate level to reflect the capabilities of the 
Senior Leadership 
Experience in position
Staff Experience in 
position
Senior Leadership 
Cohesiveness
Staff Certifications, 
Training and 
Motivations
External Program 
Support Program Office Size
Level 0
Has less than 1 year 
experience
Has less than 1 year 
experience
Has not worked 
together
Staff has minimal 
Acquisition training; few 
if any certifications
No interest beyond 
MAJCOM
No formal program 
office yet
Level 1
Has 1 to 3 years 
experience
Has 1 to 3 years 
experience
Has worked together for 
less than 6 months
Staff has some 
Acquisition training & 
Certifications Some interest
Less than 50% of 
authorized staffing 
Level
Level 2
Baseline
Has 3 to 5 years 
experience with Acq 
processes
Has 3 to 5 years 
experience with Acq 
processes
Has worked together for 
1 year
All Staff has some 
Acquisition training & 
Level I Certifications
Senior leadership 
helping with Acq 
process
Between 50% and 70% 
of authorized staffing 
Level
Level 3
Has years of Acquisition 
Experience
Has years of Acquisition 
Experience
Has worked together for 
1 to 3 years
Motivated, certified 
(some Level II) and 
trained staff
Senior leadership wants 
program to go
Greater than 70% of 
authorized staffing 
Level
Level 4
Has been steering 
program through Acq 
Process
Has been steering 
program through Acq 
Process
Has worked together for 
3 to 5 years but not 
more
Highly motivated and 
trained staff 
(Certifications Levels I, 
II, and III as 
appropriate)
Senior leadership and 
congressional interest
Fully staffed to 
authorized staffing 
Level
Acquisition Maturity Potential Matrix 
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SPO.   Appendix B documents the activities selected that will be impacted by this global 
variable.  This variable has levels from 0 to 4 which modify the triangular distribution impact for 
the timelines of the discrete events.   
3) Challenges in modeling the activities in the requirements process are found where the 
urgency for a capability receives various levels of advocacy from senior leadership.  If a program 
is influenced a certain way, some of the modeled process could be waived or bypassed.  
However, through this research, no distinguishable pattern was found for waiving processes.  
Leadership may change which increases or decreases momentum behind a program.  Programs 
could “sit on hold” for years while different political processes churn.  On the other hand, urgent 
needs could enter the process at varying points.  Although the rapid capability acquisition 
framework was designed for ERAM, further research is required to implement this process.  
Even when it is implemented, there will remain a level of uncertainty as to how personalities will 
influence this unique process. 
4) This research approach did not add any further PPB&E activities to ERAM 1.0.  
Although there was a cost growth check during technology development, no further events were 
added to the model.  This calendar driven process was also simulated at a certain level in ERAM 
1.0 and to add further detail to that model would be outside the scope of this effort.  It is left for 
further research to include higher fidelity modeling in this category. 
5) The probability of the various triangular distributions on event timelines in later 
versions of ERAM is based on a small sample size due to the limited number of available 
personnel for interviews.  Schedule constraints also limited access to SMEs in certain areas.  
Further research should increase the sample base and improve the fidelity of these distributions.    
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6) OSD has the authority to issue a Resource Management Decision (RMD) to a SPO 
directing specific actions for their program.  This can occur at any time during a program.  Since 
this is such an unpredictable event, this will be left for further research to determine the best 
model entry points.  Examples of the RMD could include specifying an acquisition strategy, 
downward directed contracting methods, or other directives, all of which could significantly 
impact the timeline to reach MS-C. 
 7) PMs and other SPO personnel may have irregular tasking or requests from outside 
agencies.  These events occur outside the regular flow of the process model.   These irregular 
“firefighting” activities that acquisition personnel accomplish are partially modeled in 
uncertainty events which were included in the original ERAM and are also explained further in 
this research paper.   However, due to the unpredictability of these events, they are not modeled 
explicitly for every possibility.  The number of permutations or possibilities is too large to 
accomplish in this effort.  The actual performance of any process depends on two factors: the 
amount of time spent working and the capability of the process used to do that work (Repenning 
and Sterman 2001).  Figures 13 through 15 below shows how there is a balance needed between 
spending resources improving the process and the time spent working on the current activities.   
Two approaches are “Working Harder” and “Working Smarter”.   
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Figure 13: Work Harder Balance Loop (Repenning and Sterman 2001) 
Figure 13 describes a process where an organization focuses on the current activities or “fires”.  
Training and other improvement efforts are put on hold.  In the Work Harder loop as 
performance expectations are not met, pressure to produce more increases which lengthens the 
time spent working.  However, as an individual’s time is maxed out working the current issues, 
this model demonstrates that long term performance decreases.   
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Figure 14: Work Smarter Balance Loop (Repenning and Sterman 2001) 
Figure 14 shows a cycle of competing demands of working current issues and the pressure to 
improve overall capability.  When the desired performance doesn’t meet the current 
performance, time is invested in improving overall capability.  If too much emphasis is placed in 
improving capability, actual performance decreases.  If too much time is spent on improvement, 
resources are removed from actual current work requirements.   
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Figure 15: Simulations of Working Harder and Smarter Strategies (Repenning and 
Sterman 2001) 
Care is needed in determining this balance.  As seen in Figure 15, when the majority of the 
emphasis is spent on working current “fires” or issues, there is a net decrease in capability and 
performance.  When there is a balance of time spent improving capability, there is a short term 
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decrease in performance but it rebounds into an overall net increase in both capability and 
performance on the current tasks.  As this balance is achieved, the uncertainty resulting from 
“firefighting” should reduce and predictability in productivity should increase.  As the ever 
increasing demands on personnel in DoD acquisitions coupled with personnel decreases, it is 
challenging to anticipate a situation where it will be easy to strike the balance as military 
personnel only remain in their positions for a short period of time.  If they invest in capability 
improvement, the net increases in capability will not be realized during their tenure.  In fact, if 
they implement process improvements, they may be in the short term productivity “well” shown 
in Figure 15 (top right graphic).  Understanding leadership and applying these human factors are 
considerations in modeling the acquisition process for ERAM.   
8) The capability gap analysis, requirements development, JCIDS process and acquisition 
system change significantly every 10 years or less.  The names of documents, processes, reviews, 
and others change frequently.  Therefore, to find historical data upon which the outputs of 
ERAM are based upon was extraordinarily challenging, especially for space.  Space programs 
take 10-15 years.  Due to budget constraints, it appears that new program of record starts will be 
very rare.  Current programs of record will be modified and upgraded in place of new starts.  
Thus the “fuzzy front end” of the requirements process could be iterations of existing programs 
returning to earlier parts of the acquisition process. 
9) Most importantly, it’s necessary to accept the fact that every capability development 
program is unique!  Basing the development of a new capability on historical data is inherently 
flawed since the capability has never been developed and there are an infinite amount of 
unknown unknowns.  ERAM generates a histogram based on data gathered from SMEs in space 
capability development, but, there is always the chance for an outlier.  Just as the prediction of 
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future stock prices on the financial markets is impossible to do, so is the exact prediction of the 
schedule for defense capability development.  ERAM is a tool to help scope the effort of the 
problem, but, in no way can guarantee what the realized schedule will be. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
4.1 Phase 1: Information Collection & Review   
4.1.1 Interviews 
 The researchers obtained information through interviews of SMEs in the space 
development planning, requirements and acquisition fields.  The interviews revealed opinions 
about problems with existing processes and policy from personal experience as well as specific 
experiences with process activities and associated timeframes.  In an effort to consolidate and 
filter the large quantity of interview data, the data was coded into common themes resulting from 
the conversations.  Twenty-three SMEs were contacted from SAF/AQ, United States Strategic 
Command (USTRATCOM), AFSPC, and SMC.   Table 5 shows these themes in order from the 
most frequently discussed in these interviews.  Interpretation of this qualitative data resulted in 
observations and recommendations for ERAM.   
Table 5: Research Interview Themes 
 Interview Themes % Discussed 
1) SPO/MAJCOM/HHQ Interpersonal Relationships & PM Credibility 74% 
2) Direct Higher Headquarter (HHQ) Involvement 48% 
3) Requirements “creep” 30% 
4) PM Personnel Requirements 17% 
5) DP Funding 13% 
6) Requirements personnel Training 13% 
7) Senior Leadership Direction 9% 
8) Process Flexibility 9% 
 
1) In discussions with PMs at SMC, some challenges identified in the process were that 
the MAJCOM had to have all their “i’s” dotted and “t’s” crossed until they would let users or 
HHQs get involved.  This “coordination in a vacuum” proved cumbersome and introduced 
delays into the JCIDS process.  When the PM was attempting to meet demands of leadership and 
perform a rapid acquisition, their experience was that the MAJCOM was not a willing partner 
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with the goal of speeding up the process.   The PM related an analogy that the command lead 
was analogous to a pet dragon.  He would need to be regularly fed, but had the capability to 
“breathe fire” on the program meaning the ability to significantly impede program progress.   
The PM had a program to execute with milestones and deadlines to meet, but this “fire breathing 
dragon” was a matter of bureaucracy difficult to overcome.  HHQs was not receiving regular 
communication due to this challenge at command.  PMs were working on balancing relationships 
with their command leads and HHQ.  With the programs limited on staffing and funding at this 
level, they didn’t have the schedule margin or breathing room to spend enough time thinking 
about the program’s strategy.     
 Another PM’s perspective was that the credibility of the PM is what determined the 
success of the program.  By establishing credibility through continuous interactions, constant 
meetings via teleconference or in person, the program was able to maintain a continuous flow of 
communication and obtain approval on required documentation in a timely manner. Contrary to 
what was expected, this classified program completely followed the JCIDS and DoDI 5000.02 
acquisition policy without seeking waivers.  The program followed guidance from Dr. Ashton 
Carter’s memo dated 14 Sep 2010 for greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending.  
This guidance included initiatives on affordability, improved cost management, and improved 
incentivizing of the industry partners.   Due to the successful implementation of these measures, 
the credibility of the PM, and continuous communication practices, this program successfully 
completed the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) in a record 41 minutes.  Unlike many other 
space programs, this program had the luxury of hand selecting team members from the SPO to 
achieve an “all-star” team.  The relationship with the SPO and the Program Element Monitor 
(PEM) was ideal.  Each party understood their lanes of the road.  Vigilant leadership established 
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credibility and a well established line of communication with HHQs enabling this remarkable 
achievement. 
 According to other senior leaders and systems engineers at the center, the proposition that 
“acquisition is a team sport” was reinforced.  The forging of relationships and constant 
situational awareness of programmatics among all levels was crucial to positive feedback and 
program success.  Indeed, acquisition success was based on the people, their ownership in 
program success, and the continuous flow of information.   
 2) A PM identified where a RMD was issued by OSD in order to provide direction to a 
program.  In this case, the RMD was issued to define the program’s acquisition strategy.  This is 
an OSD document to direct a program when the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) 
process doesn’t fix problems in the program.  It “gets overwhelming fixing problems one year at 
a time”.   Therefore, the process of maintaining levels of communication with HHQs helps to 
alleviate any misinformation with respect to the expectations of the program.   
3) Systems engineering has received a large amount of press with respect to its ability to 
make or break a program’s performance.  A challenge identified by members was the lack of 
disciplined configuration control of requirements and a clear understanding of how to manage 
the trade space between overarching system-level requirements and derived requirements.  It is 
extremely difficult for a program manager and chief engineer to manage the technical 
performance of their program with a “moving target” of requirements.  Even when key 
performance parameters (KPP) are defined and a capability development document (CDD) is 
signed and delivered to a SPO, requirements creep tends to continue to manifest itself in 
programs.  These are not formal changes to the CDD, they are small changes such as e-mails that 
don’t get reviewed.  The quandary is in how much direction the SPO can provide the contractor 
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within the scope of the contract without going through an often timely and costly formal 
engineering change process (ECP).  There needs to be some level of control and tracking, but 
within the proper balance.   
4) One PM’s approach to balancing programmatic issues was to model the Commander’s 
intent and delivered a PM’s intent similar to the Joint Operations Planning Process.  This 
delivered the message and maintained a focus within the members of the SPO.  His 
recommendation was to limit a PM’s team to no more than 40 people.  This was the maximum 
amount a single leader could have to be effective and manage the “face time” of the subordinates 
to provide programmatic direction.   
 5) The S&T community within the DoD also weighed in on the acquisition process.   
Many good ideas are developed at the research labs in basic and applied research.  As these ideas 
grow in technological maturity, the lead developer, whether it is the government sponsor or 
contractor will start to look for sponsorship and advocacy.  However, it is extremely difficult in a 
constrained budget environment to obtain funding for new ideas.  One member of the S&T 
community had been advocating for a program that maintained its priority just below the 
MAJCOM cut line.  DP is never included in cost estimates.  The Program Element (PE) or 
budget line for activities prior to MS-B is not consistently funded or defended during the PPB&E 
process and is often used as a source of funds to pay other bills.  Therefore, these DP activities 
require sponsorship from an organization with some level of discretionary funding.   
 6) Continued conversations with MAJCOM personnel highlighted the results of changes 
and areas of emphasis from the AIP dated 4 May 2009.  It states: “Requirements must be 
acquisition-friendly and produced in a format that is readily adaptable for use during source 
selection and throughout the acquisition process”.  The MAJCOM recognized that their 
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personnel needed to be trained in requirements management and development.  Therefore, they 
developed a requirements certification program.  This created a uniform methodology to grow 
requirements leads and meet the intent of the AIP. 
 7) AFSPC senior leaders desire the ability to quickly understand the impacts a single 
program may have across the space capability spectrum.  This requires developing and actively 
maintaining a robust space systems architecture.  As capability development program schedules 
deviate or requirements are modified, being able to identify the implications is currently a timely, 
costly and difficult challenge, at best. 
One example of a challenging aspect of modeling the acquisition processes is the 
leadership and its influence on the program.  According to one perspective, “senior leadership is 
the wildcard in the process”.   One program was tackling the multiple organizations vying for 
opportunities to manage it.  It was led by two Program Executive Officers (PEO) responsible for 
different components of the overall program.  With two programs reporting to different chains of 
command, it was extremely difficult to have any synergy in program execution.  This program 
had an approved Operational Requirements Document (ORD) based on previous acquisition 
guidance.  Nine subsequent CDDs were developed.  Five years after ORD approval, the program 
was cancelled by SAF.  The bottom line was that a large acquisition program should not be split 
between two centers and two PEOs for political purposes. 
 Although, small programs in theory would have less oversight from HHQ, there are some 
exceptions.  Programs that fall under the Joint Capability Areas (JCA) deemed as “JROC Interest 
Items” will automatically be reviewed at the highest level.  According to one requirements lead, 
that is “overkill”.  The JCAs categorized as a JROC Interest Items include: Command and 
Control (C2), Net Centric, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).  Therefore, 
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JCIDS milestones for a small ACAT III level program at these JCAs would have several more 
months of time due to this level of interest.  If the proposed capability is a JROC Interest Item, 
historically, another three months is required to get an ICD written and through the Air Force 
Requirements Oversight Council (AFROC).  Cumulatively, an additional nine to twelve months 
is required to get a JROC approved ICD.  Of note, nearly all space programs fall within the 
JROC Interest Item category. 
 8) One criticism of the JCIDS requirements model was the lack of flexibility.  Those 
working in requirements for Information Technology (IT) or Cyber were confronting the 
challenges of accomplishing the various events of the JCIDS process while attempting to 
perform these in a rapid fashion in keeping up with the fast moving pace of IT.  Senior 
leadership would perhaps question the slow pace of meeting JCIDS milestones in this cyber or 
IT environment.  For example, if software or a piece of standard computer hardware needed to be 
upgraded it would require an AoA and other activities.  The MAJCOM leads suggested that in 
the IT world, with the requirement to perform rapid technology refreshes, all of the JCIDS steps 
should be accelerated or eliminated.  This would be able to significantly compress the timelines.  
The AoA could be replaced with a business case analysis which could be completed in less than 
a month with a small number of personnel.  The MAJCOM lead said “I don’t want the process to 
be different.  It needs leadership to be able to apply flexibility.” 
JCIDS Process Inputs: 
 Of the 23 individual contacts 12 were able to provide input to validate ERAM 1.0 and 
provide updated information.  A portion of the interviews was spent understanding 
organizational roles and responsibilities.  From AFSPC/A5, it is SMC’s responsibility to develop 
materiel solutions in response to AFSPC’s validated shortfalls and gaps that are discovered in the 
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CBA.  The CBA is a MAJCOM responsibility that is accomplished by an O-6 led Capability 
Team.  The capability teams at AFSPC are identified in Table 6. 
Table 6: AFSPC Capability Teams (AFSPC/CV 2010) 
Primary Director Capability Team 
A5 Situational Awareness/Command & Control (SA/C2) 
A3 Space Protection and Information Operations 
A5 Missile Warning/Missile Defense (MW/MD) 
A2 Battlespace Awareness/Technical Intel (BA/TI) 
A3 Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) 
A5 MILSATCOM 
A3 Launch, Ranges and Networks 
A5 Operationally Responsive Space 
A3 Training, Exercises and Evaluations 
A3 Current Operations 
A5 Policy and Integration 
A8 Total Force Integration (TFI) 
A3 Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) 
A3 Cyber Warfare 
A3 Cyber Operations 
A6 Cyber Infrastructure 
A3 Testing, Modeling & Simulation 
A8 Nuclear Issues and Matters 
 
These Capability Teams request space DP efforts from AFSPC/A5X on behalf of combatant 
commanders (COCOM) (i.e. Warfighter).  AFSPC/A5X has a 30 day timeline to develop a 
proposal and provide it back to the Capability Team for approval.  In addition to DP activities 
from the Capability Teams, AFSPC/A5X does an annual AF wide data call for DP proposals in 
early November (AFMC/A2/5 2010). 
While accomplishing the DP activity, AFSPC can tap into technical SMEs through 
SMC/XR or directly through an existing SMC SPO.  One of the products of DP from SMC is the 
CCTD.  Ultimately, this early analysis focuses on determining if the Materiel Development 
Decision (MDD) Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) should direct accomplishing a new 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).  Depending on the urgency of the capability, either CYBER 
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SAFARI (6-9 months) or traditional (8-12 months) DP is accomplished.  With an appropriate 
level of technical analysis and early systems engineering applied during the CCTD development, 
AoA activities should be reduced from 18-24 months to just 6-9 months.  Of note, no space 
AoAs were accomplished in FY10; three space system MDDs are scheduled for FY11. 
 The process for developing a CCTD in the DP process is initiated by the MAJCOM.   
“Capability Teams will meet regularly and frequently and will address the full sets of issues 
(requirements, trade-offs, human resources, training, infrastructure, tactics and procedures) in 
defining, developing, fielding and operating a new capability.  Capability Teams will be major 
contributors to the IPP and Corporate Processes”  (AFSPC 2008).   After an ICD was complete 
through the IPP, the MAJCOM A5 issued a DP request to the Center XR for a new concept, or to 
the Center SPO for an upgrade.  The Center is given 30 days to provide a DP Proposal back to 
the MAJCOM.  This DP action is in essence the development of a CCTD.  These CCTDs can 
carry single or multiple concepts.  The draft CCTD is expected approximately 8 months after 
start with the final completed by 12 months.  The concepts from the CCTD studies are the 
“alternatives” used in an analysis of alternatives.   
 The document administrator at HQ/AF is A5RP.  A5RP provides guidance on the 
standardized package that should be submitted for HHQ coordination.  Typically, it takes 
approximately two months to have a document reach the A5RP chaired Requirements Strategy 
Review (RSR).  This review essentially approves the pursuit of authoring the ICD for the 
capability under consideration.  Once the RSR approves, the ICD can be drafted as quickly as 
one week by the High Performance Team (HPT), depending on the urgency and available 
resources.  The draft ICD can be entered into internal (AFSPC) and external (SAF and OSD) 
coordination simultaneously with appropriate AFSPC senior leader approval to save time.  
54 
 
Coordination requires a minimum of three weeks.  Upon completion of coordination, the 
document will be reviewed by the AFROC.  In this example, the AFROC met three weeks after 
coordination and comment resolution.  Another document that will be required is the AoA Study 
Guide.  Based on previous examples, in this case, it only took one day to author this document.  
Of note, OSD/CAPE is responsible for approving this document for JROC Interest Items.  The 
example that was discussed in the interview was being driven by AFSPC/A5 (Brigadier General) 
and was definitely unique.  Other capability documents would likely take three times as long to 
work through this process. 
 From another AFSPC/A5 source, there are two ways capability development is kicked 
off: 1) downward directed, or 2) determining the needs of the warfighter.  The most timely way 
to kickoff capability development is to tie the requirement to an existing/approved ICD, 
alleviating many of the early JCIDS activities since they were previously accomplished. 
 The CBA is heavily influenced by US Strategic Command (USTRATCOM)/J8 
(representing warfighter needs), however, most of the analysis is accomplished by AFSPC with 
support from SMC.  A CBA for a revolutionary capability (new system) will require six to 
twenty-four months while one for an evolutionary capability (upgrade an existing system) will 
take approximately three to six months.   
 From another AFSPC interview, the ICD requires one month to write and requires six to 
nine months for coordination and approval.  The ICD may result in no action or kick off 
preparation for MDD and ADM.  Policy requires that funding must be set aside to reach the next 
milestone.  In the case of getting an ADM from the MDA at the MDD, this requires funding 
through MS-A. 
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 Another valuable note from the AFSPC interviews was the fact that either AFSPC or 
USTRATCOM could sponsor an ICD.  Should the combatant command sponsor the ICD, this 
relieves the AFSPC action officer from Air Force specific coordination activities (RSR and 
AFROC). 
4.1.2 General Comments/Other Tools: 
ADDM: 
As the research team continued to detail the processes and activities at SMC, AFSPC and 
SAF/AQRE, it became apparent that other independent efforts with goals similar to that of 
ERAM were underway at AFSPC and ASC/XR.  On 28 October, 2010, Mr. Blaise Durante, 
SAF/AQX, issued a memorandum with the subject of “Acquisition Document Development and 
Management Initiative”.  This was distributed to each of the Air Force PEOs as well as the 
Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE) at SMC, Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC), 
Electronics Systems Center (ESC) and Air Armament Center (AAC).  It summarized the purpose 
of ADDM and directed the following actions: 
1) PEO: Identify the priority and timing for each of your program offices to begin 
utilizing ADDM and communicate that list with SAF/AQXI in order to establish the 
deployment and support schedule—complete within two weeks of the date of this 
memorandum; 
2) PEO and ACE: Begin to use ADDM to identify and track acquisition milestone 
readiness status of acquisition programs in your portfolios; 
3) PEO and ACE: Communicate ideas for improvement or enhancement of ADDM. 
ASC/XR has been made aware of this initiative and is beginning to implement this tool 
(SAF/AQX 2010). Unlike ERAM, this tool focuses on the detailed tasks during execution and 
helps provide the program with document templates depending on where they are in the 
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acquisition process.  ERAM is a modeling tool that focuses on the overall process and providing 
early schedule analysis data to decision makers prior to MDD.   Figure 16 shows some of the 
capabilities of translating DoDI 5000.02 into an executable roadmap.  The roadmap is similar to 
Microsoft Project® to layout a program schedule.  The SPO is then able to tailor the roadmap 
and document templates.  ADDM enables the planning, tailoring, development, tracking, review 
and approval of milestone acquisition document content to successfully meet the next milestone 
decision date. Additionally it provides authoritative references, guidance, and instructions. It has 
the capability to dynamically generate documents based on most current data in system 
(ASC/XRCC 2010). 
 
 
Figure 16: ADDM (ASC/XRCC 2010) 
 
Three major activities need to be performed in order to achieve target milestones.
The Roadmap Manager participates in each of these activities
1. Create Roadmap
2. Roadmap Setup
• Tailor Roadmap
• Create/Manage Team
• Initiate Document Scheduling
• Finalize Roadmap
3. Execute Roadmap
• Involves all team members
• Roadmap Manager monitors progress
• Register Milestone Decision
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RAMP: 
AFSPC/A5 has taken the initiative to develop a comprehensive space architecture that 
will enable better understanding of the interdependencies of all space capabilities and the 
impacts current acquisition programs may have on existing and/or planned capabilities.  AFSPC 
acknowledged the need to identify requirements generation process improvements to bring the 
“speed of need to space & cyber acquisition”.  They identified nine root causes to these 
challenges which are: procedures, tribal knowledge, resources, process discipline, monitoring, 
quality assurance/quality control, requirements definition, poor correlation funding and 
requirements, and systems engineering issues.  To work towards overcoming these challenges, 
they implemented a four-prong approach which is: process, knowledge infrastructure, 
organization, and people (Gilchrist 2011).  RAMP’s development contributes to these solutions.  
To accomplish this, the first step A5 accomplished was to develop an all inclusive WBS structure 
of all activities that occur at both AFSPC and SMC when developing a capability.  RAMP 
documents requirements and acquisition at a top-level process and integrates with Microsoft 
Project®.  This tool references guidance and policy.  It allows the user to schedule activities, 
track resources and tailor their activities  (Gilchrist 2011).  Figure 17 shows this tailorable 
Microsoft Project ® schedule that is generated.   
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Figure 17: RAMP (Gilchrist 2011) 
APM: 
The Acquisition and Excellence and Change Office (SAF/AECO) developed another 
process model of the acquisition system. It is called the Acquisition Process Model (APM).    
The intent of APM provides the documented current state process in an interactive fashion.  In 
2009, the ACPO commissioned DSD Laboratories' Center for Reengineering and Enabling 
Technology (CRET) to develop the APM.  The APM is a compilation of policy, instructions, and 
guidance for persons involved in the acquisition process.  The APM accomplishes the following 
goals:  Establishes standard definition and activities associated with AF Acquisition; provides an 
integration context for other external/related process models; provides the process input to 
Acquisition Enterprise Architecture and other Enterprise Architectures; provides a standard 
reference model for all stakeholders; and provides a common context for process improvement 
initiatives (AF/ACPO 2011).  APM is an interactive tool to interface with various portions of the 
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acquisition “wall chart”.  The user can “click” on each block to get further details on a particular 
portion of the acquisition process.  Figure 18 shows an example of the interactive web page.   
 
 
Figure 18: Acquisition Process Model (ACPO 2011) 
Take-Away: 
Although the objectives of each organization and their respective tools are unique, the 
data required to develop the respective tools may be shared.  For example, ERAM is a simulation 
model that identifies key high-level activities and associated distributed times of these activities 
from capability gap analysis through Milestone C.  It enhances CCTDs that will be used during 
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the AoA when determining which Materiel Solution should be selected and pursued.  Similarly, 
RAMP identifies all the activities and a specific time associated with each activity as well.  
ADDM is an acquisition tool that provides standardized templates of required acquisition 
documents, of which will be required at various points in ERAM and RAMP.  APM provides an 
interactive repository of process guidelines and steps to aid acquisition professionals in their 
understanding of the acquisition processes.  There appears to be great potential for these tools to 
collaborate together. 
4.2 Phase 2:  ERAM 1.0 Analysis   
The Model 
The probabilistic discrete event model developed by Wirthlin was modified with a space 
systems focus by implementing policy change updates (post 2006) and enhanced early activities 
by identifying the JCIDS and early systems engineering activities occurring during Material 
Solutions Analysis and Technology Development phases.  The PPB&E process can significantly 
impact the execution of the programs, but, due to the dynamic and unpredictable nature of the 
defense budget, few updates were made in the model to reflect these activities.  The model 
attempts to account for the budget variability by utilizing “funding check” nodes at a variety of 
places throughout the model.    The core updates to the model were divided into two sections: 1) 
updates to DoDI 5000.02 since ERAM was first developed, and 2) additions based on the JCIDS 
process specific to AFSPC. 
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4.3 Phase 3:  Identify and design updates to ERAM 1.0 
ERAM 1.1 
ERAM 1.1 focused on the changes required due to porting from Arena® to ExtendSim©.   
The Aerospace Software Engineers audited the software to ensure that the results from ERAM 
1.1 were comparable to ERAM 1.0.  The artifacts of running a new simulation software program 
generated a small number of changes.  These specific changes were implemented and updated 
into ERAM 1.1 as the baseline for future changes.  The validation and verification of this model 
is being conducted wholly by Aerospace and is outside the scope of this effort. 
ERAM 1.2 
Policy and guidance is constantly evolving based on the political climate, lessons-learned 
from existing or cancelled programs, funding constraints and others.  The changes implemented 
in ERAM 1.2 reflect space acquisition policy updates currently being incorporated into DoDI 
5000.02.  Previous space policy documents and interim guidance have been rescinded while 
policy memos are serving as the interim guidance.  Additionally, updates to DoDI 5000.02 since 
ERAM 1.0 are being incorporated into the model.  Figure 19 describes specific DoDI 5000.02 
updates to include the preliminary design review (PDR) moving prior to MS-B, with a 
placeholder for PDR occurring post MS-B, as required.    
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Figure 19: DoD 5000.02 Updates (OUSD/ATL 2008) 
Figure 20 identifies the space specific acquisition process updates incorporated into the 
2008 version of the DoDI 5000.02; ERAM 1.0 was based on the 2003 DoDI 5000.02 version.  
ERAM 1.2 added MDD, IPAs and Post SDR assessment.  These IPAs were added to support 
MDA decisions.   
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Figure 20: Space Acquisition Policy Updates to DoD 5000.02 (Skotte 2010) 
ERAM 2.0 
ERAM 2.0 focused on incorporating the changes from the SPO capability matrix.  This 
was designed by instituting a human factors variable to be implemented as a global variable in 
various timed activities in ERAM.  This was designed through discussions with the Aerospace 
design leadership and the researchers to determine impacted timelines.  It was based on the 
collective understanding and knowledge of the researchers combined with learning from 
readings and interviews.  Once these events were identified they were delivered to the design 
team to implement in ERAM 2.0.  Recall that Table 4 showed the factors that determine the 
overall experience level of a program office which in turn changes timelines for processes in 
ERAM.   
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This global variable skews the triangular timeline distributions results from an aggregation of the 
above capabilities.  It includes the number of years the senior leadership holds a position, the 
years of experience of the staff members, unit cohesion between the senior leaders and their 
subordinates, the formal certification training, support from external organizations, and the 
percentage of filled positions in the program office.  The factors contribute to the aggregated 
global variable calculated and then applied to the impacted process activities (see Appendix B).  
The global variable has levels from 0 to 4 which determine how the triangular distribution of for 
the timelines of the discrete events is skewed.   
ERAM 2.1 
 
Figure 21: ERAM 2.2 Design 
 Figure 21 illustrates the activity diagram developed in Microsoft Visio that shows the 
basic activities involved between capability gap analysis up through conducting an AoA, post 
MDD.  This diagram went through numerous iterations based upon feedback from both AFSPC 
and SAF/AQ personnel familiar with the processes.  This is a collaborative representation of the 
processes, as everyone interviewed has varying opinions how S&T research, capability gap 
analysis, DP, JCIDS, CCTD and AoA processes occur and are interrelated.  During this portion 
of the report, the activities and processes will be discussed and how they are intended to 
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compliment other processes to deliver new defense capabilities.  Additionally, the methods to 
determine the triangular distributions of time required for each activity and decision point 
probabilities will be discussed as well as the results of the analysis. 
Strategic Discussion: 
Before discussing the details of the various processes and organizational relationships, 
it’s beneficial to look at the problem from the strategic level.  Two common philosophies were 
discovered in discussions with personnel familiar with defense acquisitions and capability 
development:  technology pull and technology push.  The first is when the warfighter 
(COCOMs) identify a capability gap and request it be addressed by the respective MAJCOM—a 
reactionary response.  The second method occurs when industry, universities or defense 
laboratories proactively market technologies and their potential capabilities to the MAJCOM, 
Joint Staff and/or Air Staff.  This is referred to as technology push and addresses emerging 
threats (both theoretical and realized) that maturing technology may address—the proactive 
development of military applications.  In the opinion of the authors, both are necessary, however, 
technology push is critical for the United States to continue to maintain its military superiority 
against all adversaries.   
Expanding upon the concept of technology pull, a gap has been identified and has war 
fighter sponsorship, implying congressional and/or flag officer interest.  Senior leader 
sponsorship is critical to navigate the DoD capability development process since there are 
numerous reviews and decision points where a concept can be shelved.  The higher the rank of 
the sponsor, the less likely it will be shelved.  The problem with this method is the JCIDS 
process is often not timely enough to adequately satisfy the urgency of the need.  Hence, 
PPB&E, requirements management and acquisition activities often become jumbled and result in 
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a chaotic work environment for each organization involved.  Valuable early systems engineering 
activities are frequently rushed or neglected due to the time and cost associated, resulting in 
decisions being made on inaccurate or insufficient data that under estimate developmental and 
delivery costs and schedule. 
In the instance of technology push, this embraces innovation and addresses emerging 
threats and/or capability gaps—the “what ifs”.  This method typically is much more difficult to 
find senior leader sponsorship since it is competing with realized threats (tech pull) and 
admittedly, has challenges making it from the research facilities into the JCIDS process to the 
acquisition centers.  In theory, during technology fairs, demonstrations and exercises, the 
MAJCOMs, COCOMs, Joint Staff and Air Staff should be exposed to the maturing technology 
and its opportunities for military application—marketing opportunities for industry.  If 
successfully marketed, the demonstrated technological advancements and their potential military 
application will trigger initiation into the JCIDS process by the MAJCOM. 
Furthermore, technology push is critical for industry to continue to grow and post profits 
for shareholders.  This research revealed it is a relatively ungoverned activity with lucrative 
potential.  To take advantage of this opportunity, industry frequently hires retired military 
personnel with acquisition experience as “Business Development” managers.  These persons are 
typically well networked within DoD staffs, knowledgeable on the capability gap analysis, 
requirements, acquisition and PPB&E systems and can be extremely valuable assets to 
companies since they are considered one of the catalysts that triggers the initiation of new 
MDAPs.   
Having discussed the two philosophies with regards to how emerging technology is used 
to enhance existing capabilities and develop new capabilities, the next portion of the report will 
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discuss the pre-MDD framework that was established for ERAM and how these two 
philosophies impact it. 
Modeling Capability Gap Analysis 
Significant time and effort was spent researching and understanding how the desire for a 
new space capability becomes a MDAP.  A very simple and basic question proved challenging to 
answer: where are new ideas for military applications created and how are they formally inserted 
into the DoD requirements and acquisition system?  There are both informal and formal S&T 
processes supporting AFSPC’s responsibility to sustain existing capabilities and develop new 
ones.  The formal process will be discussed first followed by a discussion of observations on the 
informal methods.  Figure 22 circles the region of the framework under discussion in this 
section.  It was necessary to understand this process, however, these activities and decision 
points were not modeled in ERAM as ERAM models an idea once it is in the “system”. 
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Figure 22: ERAM 2.1 Front End Design 
S&T activities are formally governed by Air Force Policy Document 61-1 (AFPD 61-1), 
Management of Science and Technology, Air Force Materiel Command Instruction 61-102 
(AFMCI 61-102), Advanced Technology Demonstration Technology Transition Planning, and 
AFSPCI 61-101, Space Science and Technology (S&T) Management.  The space S&T program 
encompasses basic research, applied research and advanced technology development with the 
goal of maturing technologies that can be utilized by AFSPC to develop materiel solutions and 
eventually by the product centers to develop both evolutionary (upgrade existing systems to 
provide new capabilities) and revolutionary (new systems delivering new capabilities) systems.  
Interestingly, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), not AFSPC, develops space S&T POM 
recommendations (with inputs from Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and each of the 
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product centers) for investment strategies to focus on developing and maturing space 
technologies.  Of note, AFRL is subordinate to AFMC, not AFSPC—this could be one of the 
reasons many of the interviewees for this research indicated there has historically been a problem 
with maturing space technology with the AFRL and transitioning it to space materiel solutions 
analysis and MDAPs at AFSPC and SMC, respectively.  This organizational structure may also 
have limited or inhibited the robust establishment of space technology expertise within AFRL.  
Senior Air Force leaders may have recognized this issue; in 2010, the newly appointed AFRL 
commander had previous assignments as the Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO) and prior to that was the Vice Commander of the SMC.  But this remains a 
piecemeal fix with no permanent process in place to address the longer term issues. 
How are AFSPC space capability and technology requirements communicated to the 
S&T community (AFRL, industry partners and academia)? According to AFSPCI 10-604, the 
AFSPC IPP is used:  
…to develop an executable Investment Strategy…Through the IPP, AFSPC identifies, 
defines and prioritizes needed capabilities, determines shortfalls that must be filled 
through modernization and transformation, assesses HIS requirements, and develops a 
fiscally and technologically achievable plan.  The IPP follows phases known as FAA to 
determine, categorize and prioritize the basic functions the command must perform; FNA 
that identifies and prioritizes the capability shortfalls; FSA to assess possible materiel 
solutions to the shortfall; and Integrated Investment Analysis to determine the optimal 
force structure given resource constraints.  Outputs required by the HQ AFSPC/A3/A5 in 
support of this AFSPCI include a capabilities needs list (shortfalls), an analysis of 
solutions and some initial MAJCOM-level FSA data for JCIDS and the results of IIA that 
include system roadmaps (out year funding profiles, IOCs, EOLs and other key 
milestones (AFSPC/A3F 2007). 
 
One of the products of the IPP is the Strategic Master Plan (SMP).  This document is intended to 
provide prioritized guidance to the labs with regards to what emerging space technologies 
require further research and development to meet the long term capabilities AFSPC is required to 
provide to the combat commands. 
70 
 
After reviewing the AFIs and AFSPCIs, the space S&T process was summarized and 
shared with AFSPC to confirm the research accurately depicted the process.  Unfortunately, their 
response indicates that the processes outlined by the instructions are not current.  This highlights 
a major problem for anyone involved in S&T and capability development.  Implications include:  
1) inability for formal training curriculum to be developed on the process since it’s frequently 
changing, 2) inability for outside organizations to be able to read instructions to understand other 
organizations processes resulting in degraded inter-organizational processes, and 3) numerous 
conflicting interpretations of what the enterprise process should be according to individual 
organizations resulting in significant confusion.  Not only does this occur at AFSPC, it is very 
likely that this occurs at SMC, SAF and OSD and is a problem throughout DoD. 
The following is a summary of the changes in the original process outlined in the 
published instructions as explained by a source at AFSPC.  AFSPC/A8X is responsible for the 
IPP.  The IPP no longer produces a SMP (as the instruction indicates).  In 2008, the IPP posted a 
classified Space Re-capitalization Plan (SRP), replacing the SMP.  Recently, the SRP was 
replaced with the Service Core Functions (SCF).  The Air Force SCF Master Plan 2010 is the 
most current version; it is Air Force wide and not specific to space.  AFSPC/A8X is currently 
working on the AFSCP Core Function Master Plan for both space and cyberspace.  Additionally, 
AFSPC/CC signed the classified 2011 Space S&T Guidance document. 
Bottom line, the formal process is for AFSPC to provide prioritized guidance through the 
IPP to the S&T community on what capability gaps exist and possibly require additional 
investment in maturing technologies to achieve those capabilities.  The S&T community includes 
defense laboratories, academia as well as industry partners.  Theoretically, this guidance 
encourages them to invest in technologies and concepts that could potentially become MDAPs 
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delivering advanced capabilities (this research effort did not substantiate this). Figure 23 
summarizes the flow for S&T efforts to meet MAJCOM and COCOM capability needs. 
 
Figure 23: Science & Technology Process (Walker/Pawlikowski 2011) 
 Now that the basic S&T framework as defined by policy and instructions for formal 
capability analysis and technology development has been presented, it’s appropriate to discuss 
the informal and undocumented processes.  Interviews with SMC, AFSPC and informal 
discussions with defense industry members revealed that not all capabilities and concepts are 
“pulled” by AFSPC through the IPP.  Rather, there is a more innovative method in which our 
industry partners, laboratories and academia “market” new concepts to DoD members.  This can 
be as informal as a discussion during a game of golf about a cool and innovative idea to the 
actual demonstration of technology that delivers capabilities not considered by AFSPC.   
ATD, Paper Concepts, Prototypes, Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) 
and Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Initiatives are not all inclusive of the 
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“capability development ideas” that the IPP is exposed to, but, represents a subset of what likely 
occurs.  The official activity flow indicates that the IPP and the Applied Technology Council 
(ATC) determine what capabilities to pursue further.  The quickest, and often time easiest, path 
is to find an existing, approved ICD that the capability would fall under (typically evolutionary).  
If there isn’t an existing ICD, then depending on how the proposed capability was injected into 
the IPP will determine the ERAM path that will result in a JROC approved ICD.  The next 
section of this report will discuss the initial stages of ERAM as depicted in Figure 24 and how it 
tries to balance the “as is” of the process with the official process documentation. 
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Initial ERAM Activities 
 
Figure 24: ERAM ICD Check 
Once a capability gap has been identified or emerging/maturing technology has been 
successfully marketed to the DoD, the next phase begins with the JCIDS process.  This can be 
initiated one of several ways: direction/request for a CBA by the responsible MAJCOM, a JCTD, 
a Prototype, a Joint IED Defeat Initiative (not discussed—see Manual for Operation of JCIDS 
for further information), a JUON or through the Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATD). 
At AFSPC, the IPP and ATC prioritize the capability gaps and based upon resource 
limitations (funding, manpower, etc.), determine a cutline with regards to which will be pursued 
further.  For a given proposed capability above the cutline, the first step is to determine if there is 
74 
 
an approved ICD already exists.  If there is, this significantly reduces the amount of time to reach 
MDD.  Without an ICD, JCIDS heavily influences subsequent activities. 
If there is not an existing ICD, the type of capability and available technology will 
determine what JCIDS activity is accomplished.  The CBA is the default activity.  However, a 
Military Utility Assessment (MUA) is an alternative that can be accomplished for a prototype or 
JCTD.  The Joint IED Defeat Initiative Transition Packet and JUONs are also approved 
alternatives to the CBA.     
From the Manual for Operations of JCIDS, the analytical capability analysis is 
accomplished as a CBA.  The purpose of a CBA is to “identify capability needs and gaps and 
recommends non-materiel or materiel approaches to address gaps.”  Additionally, “It [the CBA] 
becomes the basis for validating capability needs and results in the potential development and 
deployment of new or improved capabilities.”  Upon CBA completion, the report includes: 1) a 
description of the mission and military problem being assessed, 2) identification of the tasks to 
be completed to meet the mission objectives, 3) identification of the capabilities required, 4) an 
assessment of how well the current or programmed force meets the capability needs, 5) an 
assessment of operational risks where capability gaps exist, 6) recommendation for possible non-
materiel solutions to the capability gaps, and 7) recommendations for potential materiel 
approaches (if required).  Should a materiel approach be required, either AFSPC or a COCOM 
(for space, USTRATCOM) must sponsor the ICD to continue pursuing the capability 
development.  
For prototypes and JCTDs, the MUA is accomplished at the completion of the 
demonstration and must have sufficient analytical data to be a suitable CBA replacement. It will 
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be the basis for the ICD preparation and be a key reference document for the CDD and 
Capability Production Document (CPD). 
A Joint IED Defeat Initiative Transition Packet is similar to the MUA in that it must 
provide sufficient analytic analysis to support the CDD and CPD.  This is designed to streamline 
the development and fielding of the technology in support of current combat operations within 
US Central Command.   
Another substitute for a CBA is when a COCOM submits a JUON.  A JUON is defined 
as an urgent operational need identified by a combatant commander involved in an ongoing 
named operation.  From JCIDS, “The scope of the combatant commander JUON will be limited 
to addressing urgent operational needs that: (1) fall outside of the established Service processes; 
and (2) most importantly, if not addressed immediately, will seriously endanger personnel or 
pose a major threat to ongoing operations” (CJCS 2011).  The activity flow for JUONs will be 
discussed separately at the end of this section. 
Not mentioned in JCIDS are the S&T activities that may result in a desired operational 
capability after the system has been developed and launched.  A recent example of this occurred 
with Tactical Satellite-3 when it transitioned from an experimental demonstration to an 
operational asset  (Air Force Magazine 2010).  To account for these activities, ERAM 
incorporated an Advanced Technology Demonstration as a “user input” option.  Similar to a 
prototype or JCTD, there will likely be a MUA or CBA equivalent report accomplished that 
documents the analytical utility of the technology and can be used to support the ICD, CDD and 
CPD, if required. 
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ICD Development & Approval 
Upon completion of the CBA, MUA or ATD, the results will be documented and feed 
directly into the ICD, a doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 
personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) change recommendation (DCR) or both.  If it is 
determined a materiel solution is not required and the capability can be met with existing 
capabilities, a DCR is written and ERAM terminates.  However, if the CBA analysis results in 
the need for a materiel solution, then the process of writing an ICD begins.  See Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25: DOTMLPF Analysis 
The first decision point after it has been determined an ICD is required is to determine 
who the sponsor is.  For space, either USTRATCOM (COCOM) or AFSPC (MAJCOM) 
sponsors the ICD.  If it is sponsored by the COCOM, this eliminates several Air Force specific 
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requirements, as shown in the activity diagram.  However, if the ICD is sponsored by the 
MAJCOM, the next activity is the RSR.  The purpose of this review is for the sponsor (AFSPC) 
to identify the funding strategy for the Materiel Solution Analysis and Technology Development 
phases.  As stated in AFI 63-101, prior to milestone approval, funding must be available and 
identified to reach the next milestone.  In this case, funding must be available from JROC 
approval of the ICD through MS-A (SAF/AQ 2009). 
Upon approval at the RSR, AF/A5RD establishes and facilitates a HPT with the objective 
of writing the ICD.  The HPT is led by the sponsor (AFSPC) and ideally has 7-11 core members 
consisting of space SMEs from AFSPC, SMC, FFRDC and government support contractors.  
“This core team’s objective is to capture, articulate and document the operator’s requirements in 
minimum time, while achieving stakeholder buy-in” (AFSPC/A3F 2007).  One advantage of the 
HPT is it facilitates simultaneous coordination with Air Force, Joint Staff, Service and Agency 
coordination.  Failure to utilize the HPT results in sequential staffing of the document. 
Once the ICD has been drafted by the HPT, it enters O-6 level coordination.  For Air 
Force coordination, this is accomplished with the Information and Resource Support System 
(IRSS).  The Knowledge Management/Decision Support (KM/DS) database is used for joint O-6 
and flag officer coordination of JCIDS documents.  This activity in the framework includes the 
time required to submit the document for coordination as well as time for review and comment 
resolution. 
After document coordination and comment resolution is complete, the ICD is ready to be 
reviewed by the AFROC.  This activity includes the lead time required to get on the AFROC 
agenda and complete the formal review.  If approved by the AFROC, the document will proceed 
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to the Gatekeeper, the J-8/Deputy Director for Requirements, for review and document 
designation. 
The Gatekeeper will review all JCIDS documents regardless of ACAT, previous 
delegation decisions, or previous joint potential designator (JPD) decisions and assign a JPD.  
Possible JPDs are “JROC Interest”, “Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) Interest”, “Joint 
Integration”, “Joint Information” or “Independent”.  Of the nine Joint Capability Areas (JCA), 
four of the areas automatically bin the capability as “JROC Interest”; from AFSPC sources, 
space almost always falls in one of these four JCAs.  Table 7 from the Manual for Operation of 
JCIDS indicates the offices required to coordinate with depending on JPD assignment. 
Table 7: Joint Staffing Matrix (CJCS 2011) 
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Figure 26 summarizes the flow of activities and timelines for a JPD of “JROC Interest” 
or “JCB Interest”.  This is essentially the detailed version of the circled ERAM activities in 
Figure 25.  However, in ERAM 2.1, the model does not specifically identify each of the activities 
from Figure 26, but, rather incorporates all the times into the triangular distribution for each of 
the major reviews (Functional Capabilities Board (FCB), JCB and JROC). 
 
Figure 26: JROC Process (CJCS 2011) 
The ERAM framework simplifies this process, but does account for all the time required 
to coordinate a document through the Joint Staff and have it approved.  Figure 27 was a valuable 
source of data for ERAM activity times; it specified both regulatory and most likely times to 
staff a JCIDS “JROC Interest” document through the Joint Staff. 
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Figure 27: JROC Document Timeline Calculator (JROC 2009) 
Post ICD – Pre MDD 
 Once the ICD has been approved by the JROC, this signifies the Joint Staff’s validation 
of the need to fill a capability gap with a material solution.  In the ERAM framework, the next 
formal activity is DP, as depicted in Figure 28.   
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Figure 28: Early SE Design  
According to AFI 63-101, “DP is the materiel, i.e., implementing command’s (AFMC 
and/or AFSPC), contribution to AF or AF-led capability planning.  It is a collaborative process 
bridging warfighter-identified capability needs to planning for acquisition of materiel solutions.”  
Within ERAM, this activity begins following the approval of the ICD, however, in reality, DP 
can start as early as when the HPT is formed to draft the ICD; this helps jump start the activity 
and reduce overall time.  AFSPC/A5 would begin organizing the DP team while the HPT drafts 
the ICD and it works through the Joint Staff coordination process and have begun coordinating 
with the appropriate personnel at SMC to get them up to speed.  Additionally, in ERAM, DP 
activities at the Center are those required to generate the CCTD(s).  In reality, this effort may 
continue through the Materiel Solution Analysis phase of the acquisition system, depending on 
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the requirements of the capability and associated concept(s).  Figure 29 from the DP Guide 
illustrates when this activity occurs while Figure 30 describes the detailed activities.   
 
Figure 29: DP/JCIDS Process (AFMC/A2/5 2010) 
 
Figure 30: Early SE Process (SAF/AQ 2010) 
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According to the AFMC DP Guide, DP activities are led by AFSPC and/or either 
SMC/XR (revolutionary capability) or the existing SPO XR shops (evolutionary capability). 
They are responsible for providing technical support at the RSR, AFROC, JROC, Air Force 
Review Board (AFRB), MDD and AoA.  The products that are being developed during this 
activity include the CCTDs, draft AoA Study Guidance and the AoA Study Plan.  Policy requires 
the AoA Study Guide and Study Plan to be completed prior to MDD. 
 Based on discussions with AFSPC and to simplify the modeling of this process, in 
ERAM, the official DP request occurs following the approval of the ICD.  This request is sent to 
either SMC/XR or to the SPO, depending on if the capability is revolutionary or evolutionary, 
respectively.  SMC/XR or the SPO develops a proposal including number of resources and 
funding requirements for the effort and submits this to AFSPC for review.  At this point, AFSPC 
will either approve the proposal as is or kick it back to SMC for re-work.  If it is approved, 
AFSPC verifies funding is available; if it isn’t, they look for alternate funds.  If alternate funds 
are not available, the effort is shelved.  If funds are found, then the DP activities kick off.  
AFSPC and SMC work together to develop the CCTDs, the AoA Study Guide and the AoA 
Study Plan.  In order to proceed with drafting the ADM and meeting the AFRB, at a minimum, 
the AoA Study Guide and Plan must be completed.  The CCTDs necessary for the AoA effort 
ideally would be completed as part of the DP activity, but, will not hold up the MDD.   
According to AFSPC, there are very few official DP requests for space systems and all requests 
are approved and funded.   
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MDD 
Upon completion of the DP, preparation activities for the MDD begin.  The first activity 
following DP completion is the AFRB.  According to AFI 63-101, paragraph 3.7.1.1, AFRBs are 
not conducted for services or space programs.  After inquiring with SAF/AQR about this 
statement, clarification was given that Mr. Van Buren, SAF/AQ, has implemented the 
requirement for space programs to participate in the AFRB in advance of the MDD.  This is to 
ensure the SAE has been coordinated with and is prepared to fully endorse the MDD to the 
MDA.  ERAM has included this activity within the framework and model.  The AFRB activity 
includes the time required to draft and coordinate the MDD briefing and ADM.  From DoDI 
5000.02, the purpose of the MDD is: 
When the ICD demonstrates the need for a materiel solution, the JROC shall recommend 
that the MDA consider potential materiel solutions. The cognizant MDA is determined as 
described in Enclosure 3. The MDA, working with appropriate stakeholders, shall  
determine whether there is sufficient information to proceed with a Materiel  
Development Decision. If the MDA decides that additional analysis is required, a  
designated office shall prepare, and the MDA shall approve, study guidance to ensure  
that necessary information is available to support the decision 
(OUSD/ATL 2008).  
 
For space systems, the MDA is the Under Secretary of Defense, AT&L (USD/AT&L).  Prior to 
meeting with the MDA, preparation activities are jointly shared by AFSPC and SMC.  From the 
Pre-MDD Guidebook, the briefing team will present the JROC recommendation with regards to 
the ICD, and justify the business case identifying the affordability, viability of the materiel 
solution to address the gap(s).  Additionally, they must justify why an Analysis of Alternatives is 
not required (if it is proposed not to do one) or present the AoA Study Plan and Study Guide. 
 At the conclusion of the MDD, the MDA will issue an ADM that includes signed AoA 
Study Guidance, authorizes an executive steering group to oversee the AoA (if required), 
identifies what phase of the acquisition system the program will enter (pre MS-A, MS-B or MS-
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C), designates a lead service component (typically Air Force for space) and identifies 
expectations for the initial milestone review.  The phase of the acquisition cycle that will be 
directed is technically reflected within the contents of the CCTD(s) and will be summarized in 
the AoA Study Guidance.  These will document the maturity level of the technology required to 
fill the gap and recommend whether a materiel solutions analysis, technology development or 
engineering and manufacturing phase is appropriate for entry.  It is possible for the ADM to 
approve entry into a later phase and give specific direction on additional requirements necessary 
(AFMC/OAS 2010). 
Post MDD 
Following the signing of the ADM at the MDD, a significant amount of logic was 
inserted into the model to determine the probabilities of where the capability would like be 
inserted into the acquisition system.  The first attribute considered is whether the capability is 
evolutionary (upgrading an existing system in and existing SPO) or revolutionary (new system 
and a new SPO).  If the system is revolutionary, it is assumed that an AoA must be 
accomplished.  Depending on what type of system is being considered (JCTD, Prototype, ATD 
or Paper Concept) has unique probabilities for placement in the acquisition system.  Since a 
JCTD, prototype and ATD are proven prototypes, it is much more likely that they will enter the 
system pre MS-B or pre MS-C.  If the revolutionary system is a paper concept, following the 
AoA it is highly likely there will be technology development required and it will enter the system 
pre MS-A.  If the system is evolutionary, the likelihood that a previously accomplished AoA 
may be used is high.  Depending on if the system is a JCTD, prototype, ATD or paper concept 
will impact the probabilities of what phase of the acquisition system it will enter.  For example, a 
paper concept will more than likely enter pre MS-A since technology development is likely 
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required whereas a JCTD will likely be able to enter at pre MS-C since it is an upgrade to an 
existing system and the technology has been demonstrated.  Table 8 summarizes the logic used 
within ERAM 2.1 for placement in the acquisition system following the MDD and AoA activity, 
if required. 
Table 8: Acquisition System Insertion Logic 
 
With this logic established, ERAM 1.0 sufficiently identified the activities following the 
AoA and no additional framework was developed for this research effort.  To validate the 
accuracy of the flow of the ERAM 2.1 framework, it was shared with several SMEs at the Air 
Staff, AFSPC and SMC.  After approximately 11 iterations, the flow of the activity diagram was 
generally agreed upon.  This is due in large part to the various interpretations that each SME had 
with regard to the “spirit and intent” of the process.  The next portion of this phase was 
collecting the data for each activity and decision point.   
ERAM uses triangular distributions of time for the activities while the decision points 
require percentages of occurrence for each outcome, the sum being 100%.  This was both the 
most challenging portion of the research as well as the most critical, since it is the basis of 
ERAM outputs.  There were two data sources available: 1) written documentation (policy, 
instructions and guides) and, 2) SMEs.  The problem with the written documentation is too often, 
it didn’t represent reality.  There are nuances in the activities not accounted for in the policy 
timelines such as sufficient time for coordination and comment resolution.  These nuances were 
Pre MS‐A Pre MS‐B Pre MS‐C Pre MS‐A Pre MS‐B Pre MS‐C Pre MS‐A Pre MS‐B Pre MS‐C
5% 75% 20% JCTD 5% 20% 75% 5% 75% 20%
45% 50% 5% Prototype 15% 75% 10% 45% 50% 5%
45% 50% 5% ATD 15% 75% 10% 45% 50% 5%
100% 0% 0% Paper Concept 95% 5% 0% 100% 0% 0%
* AoA is always accomplished
REVOLUTIONARY
AoA Exists: 80% AoA Required: 20%
EVOLUTIONARY
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captured during the interviews with the SMEs and explain the difference between policy and 
reality.  A challenge to overcome with the SMEs was there were few that had been in positions 
for a significant period of time to be able to keep track of this type of information and answer 
specific questions.  The processes and overarching guidance that currently exist have frequently 
changed in the past decade, making it difficult to answer questions on the process as it is 
modeled in ERAM.  Additionally, JCIDS activities for space systems do not occur frequently 
enough to establish a well defined data set.    Therefore, as required with other complex discrete 
modeling simulations, the research team leveraged heuristics of the SMEs and encouraged them 
to estimate times based on their expert opinions.   
To begin data collection, two tables were built that followed the traditional space 
capability development path (not the JUON path).  Table 9 included all the activities created in 
the ERAM 2.1 framework, including available published times (from policy and instructions).  
Additional columns were added to identify the least number of days required (best case), the 
most likely days required and the most days required (worst case).   Table 10 identified all 
decision points in the framework, the possible outcomes and, based on heuristics and historical 
data, what percentage of time each outcome occurred.  For decision analysis, policy and 
instructions do not provide this type of data—this was collected solely from SMEs.  Both tables 
were shared with SMEs at the Air Staff, AFSPC and SMC with the request that they share their 
personal opinions on the times, all of which was based on historical data and experience with 
current processes.     
  
88 
 
 
Table 9: Pre MS-A ERAM Activity Timelines 
ACTIVITY 
PUBLISHED 
TIME (days) 
LEAST (days) 
MOST 
LIKELY (days) 
MOST (days) 
CBA 
90-180 
(JCIDS) 
90 (evolutionary) 
180 (revolutionary) 
150 
(evolutionary) 
540 
(revolutionary) 
180 
(evolutionary) 
720 
(revolutionary) 
MUA  120 180 360 
JUON  90 180 300 
RSR  30 60 90 
HPT 71 71 101 131 
O-6 Coord 80 80 102 123 
AFROC 52 14 74 120 
Draft ICD  71 101 131 
Joint Coord  80 102 123 
FCB 21 21 28 42 
JCB 14 14 21 35 
JROC 21 21 44 65 
DP Request  3 5 10 
DP Proposal  30 45 90 
Proposal Review  3 7 21 
DP Rework  20 30 40 
Find Alternate 
Funds 
 10 20 30 
DP  240 360 720 
Candidate 
Solution Sets 
Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
CCTD Development Concurrent with DP Activity 
Initial Concepts 
Review 
Concept 
Characterization 
Review 
Final Concepts 
Review 
Release 
Approval 
AFRB  14 21 42 
MDD  14 42 84 
MDD Rework  30 90 180 
AoA  180 360 720 
 
The cells that are not shaded indicate data was provided from the SMEs based on their 
expert opinion for an ACAT ID space program.  For those cells shaded in gray, the SMEs were 
unable to provide discrete answers; based on their own expert opinions, the authors estimated the 
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time required for these activities.  The following describes the activities in the ERAM 2.1 
framework and the work associated with each activity: 
CBA: AFSPC responsibility that requires 90-180 days for evolutionary systems and 180-720 
days for revolutionary systems.  Evolutionary systems are those that are upgrades to existing 
systems and have an established SPO; revolutionary systems are new systems and will require a 
new SPO. 
MUA: 120-360 days to write an MUA and have it approved 
JUON: the initial JUON framework was identified, however, event distributions were not 
obtained and require additional research efforts.  Rather than discard the framework, it was 
assumed in the model coding that the comprehensive distribution of time for responding to a 
JUON is at least 90 days, most likely 180 days and at most, 300 days. 
RSR: for AFSPC sponsored ICDs, AFSPC/A5X develops the RSR briefing (30-90 days), 
submits request to AF/A5RP for RSR 21 days (policy requirement) in advance of brief (JCS 
2009) 
HPT: the HPT takes 30 days (both regulatory goal and realistic) to establish the team and 
schedule the activity following RSR approval.  Per policy, the HPT itself takes 11 days and 
another 30 days are scheduled for internal coordination and cleanup (60 days realistic).  This 
results in 71 days total (policy) or 101 days (realistic) (JCS 2009). 
O-6 Review: this activity includes both the O-6 review at the MAJCOM, Air Staff and Joint 
Staff as well as the time required to submit the comment resolution matrix (CRM), document and 
briefing.  The expected time is 21 days for document review (policy), 28 days (realistic); 45 days 
for comment resolution (policy), 60 days (realistic); 14 days for submitting CRM, document and 
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brief (policy and realistic).  Therefore, policy goal total is 80 while realistically, it is 102 days 
(JCS 2009). 
AFROC: this activity includes both the AFROC meeting and, if required, flag officer review and 
comment resolution.  The AFROC requires 16 days to review documents (policy and realistic) 
and approve/disapprove.  Should a critical comment be unresolved below the flag officer level, 
the flag officer review requires an additional 21 days (policy), 28 days (realistic).  Flag officer 
comment resolution requires an additional 15 days (policy), 30 days (realistic).  SAF/AQ sources 
indicated that rarely are flag officer review and comment resolution required, therefore, the 
AFROC activity in ERAM, the least number of days is 16, the most likely number of days 
requiring flag officer review and taking 74 days (realistic) and the maximum number of days is 
120 (JCS 2009). 
Draft ICD: similar to the HPT activity that occurs for Air Force sponsored ICDs, this is the 
activity that occurs when the ICD is sponsored by the COCOM.  It incorporates time to establish 
the team, schedule the meeting and hold the meeting where the ICD will be drafted.  Despite the 
fact that the COCOM sponsors this, much of the work is accomplished at AFSPC.  Therefore, 
the same distributions from the HPT were used for this activity. 
Joint Coord: similar to the O-6 Coord activity for Air Force sponsored ICDs, this is the 
COCOM sponsored activity for coordinating the drafted ICD.  The distributions for O-6 Coord 
were used for this activity since they accomplish the same purpose. 
FCB: this activity occurs 21 days (policy) after the AFROC activities, 28 days (realistic) (JCS 
2009). 
JCB: this activity occurs 14 days (policy) after the FCB, 21 days (realistic) 
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JROC: this activity occurs 7 days (policy) after the JCB, 14 days (realistic); 14 days (policy) to 
sign the document, 30 days (realistic) for a total of 21 days (policy) or 44 days (realistic). 
DP Request: 3-10 days for AFSPC/A5 to draft a request for DP support tasked to SMC/XR or 
SPO XR (revolutionary or evolutionary capability, respectively). 
DP Proposal: SMC/XR or SPO XR has 30 days to submit DP proposal to AFSPC, however, 
based on SME experience, this can take up to 90 days for the Center to accomplish. 
Proposal Review: after the proposal is completed by SMC/XR or the SPO/XR, AFSPC reviews 
the proposal. 
DP Rework: should the proposal not be approved and require changes, it is sent back to the 
originating XR branch for rework. 
Find Alternate Funds: should funds not be immediately available for the DP effort, AFSPC 
will work to find alternate funds for the effort.  In the unlikely event they are not found, the 
effort will terminate. 
CCTD: this Center led activity occurs concurrently with the DP effort being accomplished by 
AFSPC.  Specific activities include Candidate Solution Sets Selection, Initial Concepts Review, 
Concept Characterization Review, Final Concepts Review and Release Approval.  This will be 
accomplished prior to the completion of the DP activity and is therefore not assigned duration 
distributions. 
DP: this activity concludes when AFSPC receives the CCTDs from the Center; AFSPC develops 
the ICD briefing including “Level of Investment”, Affordability Assessment, JROC 
Recommendation, AoA Study Guidance and AoA Study Plan. 
AFRB: this activity includes the number of days to draft the MDD briefing and the ADM and 
get SAE approval to proceed to the MDA. 
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MDD: this is the activity where the MDD briefing is presented and signature for the ADM is 
acquired. 
MDD Rework: should the MDA not approve the ADM and require rework, this activity 
captures the time required for this effort. 
AoA: the AoA activity may take as few as 180 days or up to 720 days to complete.  If CCTDs 
are done with the appropriate level of technical analysis, according to DP SMEs at AFSPC and 
SMC, this should reduce the amount of time AoAs took in the past (12-24 months) to just 6-12 
months, depending on the complexity of the system and available resources. 
Table 10: ERAM Pre MS-A Capability Development Decision Probabilities 
Decision Outcome (Probability %) 
Existing ICD YES (90) NO (10)  
DOTMLPF ICD and/or 
DCR (95) 
DCR (5)  
RSR Approve YES (50) NO (50)  
AFROC YES (60) NO (40)  
FCB YES (50) NO (50)  
JCB YES (75) NO (25)  
JROC YES (90) NO (10)  
DP Approve YES (99) NO (1)  
DP Funding YES (99) NO (1)  
MDD ADM YES (90) NO (10)  
AoA Exists YES (50) NO (50)  
AoA Funding YES (80) NO (20)  
JUON Post 
Deployment 
JCTD (90) Theater 
Sustainment (5) 
Demilitarize (5) 
 
The probabilities in Table 10 were the most difficult to determine.  Unique personnel 
characteristics such as rank/level of capability sponsorship, personality of SMC and AFSPC 
briefing team to gain HHQ buy-in, as well as the political environment all impact the 
probabilities of the outcome for a specific instance.  In correspondence with the SMEs, they 
struggled to provide quantitative data (probabilities) to these questions.  The notional 
probabilities are based on the expert opinions of the authors and further sampling is required to 
increase the fidelity of the data.   
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Rapid Capability Development 
 In addition to the traditional capability development methods discussed thus far, there 
also exists a more streamlined process for rapid capability development.  CJCSI 3170.01G 
accounts for this process and defines it as a Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON).  
Additionally, AFI 10-614 provides further instruction on this process.  Based on the guidance 
documents as well as a SME from SAF/AQR, the initial framework for this process was 
modeled, however, the data for the activities and decision points was not acquired. This will be 
included as a recommended topic for future ERAM research.   
Table 11 is a summary of the activities and decisions identified in the rapid capability 
development flow (JUON) for ERAM 2.1.  Further research will be required to determine the 
distributions of times required for the activities as well as the probabilities associated with the 
decision points.  The framework was derived from CJCSI 3170.01G, AFI 10-614 and an 
interview with a SAF/AQR SME.  Rather than eliminate the initial framework, it remains for 
further research to be accomplished and a single distribution was assumed for all activities 
inclusively (see Table 9).  Following the delivery of a capability in response to a JUON, three 
options are available and are denoted in the ERAM 2.1 framework as a CTR Decision.  The 
system can be demilitarized and disposed of in theater, it can be sustained in theater and funded 
by the COCOM, or it may re-enter the JCIDS process as a JCTD.  Table 10 indicates the 
probabilities the authors assumed for this decision point; further research is required to improve 
this portion of the model. 
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Table 11: JUON Activities and Decisions for Future Research 
ACTIVITY  DECISION 
J8 Review  J8 Approve 
JRAC  Sponsor 
Funding  Space 
AFSPC Tasking  COA 
QRC-IPT COA  MDD Approve 
QRC MDD  CTR Decision 
MDD ADM   
Development   
Test & Field   
 
4.4 Phase 4:  Implement design updates to ERAM 1.1, 1.2, 2.0 & 2.1 
ERAM 1.1 
ERAM 1.1 was implemented by the Aerospace design team to make the required updates 
due to the requirements of the new simulation software.  This effort was accomplished by the 
programmers in discussions with Wirthlin, the software modeling programmer for ERAM 1.0.  
These minor changes served as the ExtendSim® baseline for further, more significant model 
updates.   
ERAM 1.2 
Table 12: DoDI 5000.02 Model Change Summary 
 Model Change 
1 Move PDR to Pre-B, Add SDR (Uncertainty Flow) 
2 Move PDR to Pre-B, Add SDR (Main Flow) 
3 SDR Submodel 
4 Space Specific Submodel 
5 “What If” Submodel 
6 Cost Growth Check 
 
Table 12 summarizes the changes to ERAM 1.0 that resulted from applying updated 
space policy guidance.  Table 12 describes the data entered into each activity model for the 
triangular distributions of the timeframes.  Table 13 describes the probabilities for the decision 
points in the model for DoDI 5000.02 and space policy updates.    
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Table 13: DoDI 5000.02 Update Timelines 
ACTIVITY 
PUBLISHED 
TIME (days) 
MINIMUM 
(days) 
MOST 
LIKELY 
(days) 
MAXIMUM 
(days) 
Responsible 
Organization 
Clinger-Cohen Act 
Compliance/Assess
ment 
180 180 180 210 
 
SPO 
Rework from MDA  60 90 180 SPO 
IPA Calendar Time  7 10 30 SPO 
Cost Growth Check  14 30 60 SPO 
Significant Change 
Notice 
45 30 45 60 SPO 
MDA Approval 
Process (Cost 
Growth) 
 60 70 90 MDA 
 
Table 14: DoDI 5000.02 Decision Probabilities 
 
Decision Probability 
IPA Required YES (65%) NO (35%)  
MDA Approval 
(Post Design 
Review) 
YES (65%) NO/Rework (30%) NO/Kill (5%) 
SDR Success YES (75%) NO (25%)  
SDR 2 Success YES (90%) NO (10%)  
MDA Approval 
(Cost Growth 
Check) 
YES (65%) NO (35%)  
 
In reviewing the DoDI 5000.02 updated in 2008 and additional guidance memos, several 
areas were identified for updates in the model.  One of the main areas of change was the 
movement of PDR prior to MS-B.   
When consistent with Technology Development Phase objectives, associated prototyping 
activity, and the MDA-approved Technology Development Strategy (TDS), the PM shall 
plan a PDR before MS-B. PDR planning shall be reflected in the TDS and shall be 
conducted for the candidate design(s) to establish the allocated baseline (hardware, 
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software, human/support systems) and underlying architectures and to define a high-
confidence design (OUSD/ATL 2008). 
 
PDR in ERAM 1.1 occurs post MS-B as does System Design and Demonstration (SDD); PDR in 
ERAM 1.2 has PDR activities both before and after MS-B, with the latter optional.  SDD is 
removed in ERAM 1.2 and replaced with a technology development identifier pre MS-B.  Within 
the ExtendSim® modeling code, the PDR activity is triggered in an uncertainty event flow, as 
shown in Figure 31.  This uncertainty event flow is an artificial way to introduce some 
randomness to how an entity progresses through the model.  This uncertainty flow continuously 
checks random numbers to a probability distribution.  If the number falls within the probability 
distribution, the event proceeds forward in the process flow.  In ERAM 1.1, since the PDR was 
part of technology development, the contract association changed from 25% contract completion 
percentage.  For PDR this percentage will be 80%.  The trigger for these events is an uncertainty 
trigger which attempts to model various unpredictable events levied on the program office.  It 
occurs about every 30 days based on a random generation of an event.  It could be a funding cut 
drill or some other activity to defend their acquisition strategy.  This is an out-of-cycle activity 
levied on the program manager, which may or may not happen.  So therefore, this “uncertainty 
event” captured this unplanned activity path.  Figure 31 demonstrates this uncertainty path for 
the PDR in the contractor’s swim lane which will be moved prior to MS-B.  It checks the 
progress of the contract with contract length and time.  If the uncertainty event levied on the 
program office occurs at a time where 80% or more of the contract has progressed sufficiently, 
the PDR is triggered.  The PDR variable is set which kicks off the activities in Figure 32.    
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Figure 31: Move PDR to Pre-B, Add SDR (Uncertainty Flow) 
Figure 32 occurs in the main acquisition swim lane.   After the PDR event is triggered 
from the uncertainty event flow, approximately 80% of the technology development contract is 
complete and the SPO prepares for a down selection of competitive prototypes.  Additionally, as 
indicated in Figure 31, a PDR failure will result in a rework cycle to for the contractor and SPO 
to make corrections and then go back for approval.  This describes the original technology 
development activity prior to beginning testing.  The original technology development had lower 
levels of scrutiny.  However, the changes in the DoDI 5000.02 place a PDR toward the end of 
technology development and prior to MS-B.  “The purpose of this phase is to reduce technology 
risk, determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system, 
and to demonstrate critical technology elements (CTE) on prototypes.” (OUSD/ATL 2008).  
Figure 32 describes the addition of the SDR and PDR event flows prior to MS-B.  It also adds 
the Clinger-Cohen Compliance Assessment and approval process which runs in parallel to those 
reviews in preparation for MS-B.   
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Figure 32: Move PDR to Pre-B, Add SDR (Main Flow) 
A specific requirement for space systems directed by OSD/AT&L in DTM 09-025, Space 
Systems Acquisition Policy (18 October 2010) was that there would be a SDR early in 
acquisition “During the technology development phase, space system PMs shall conduct an SDR 
to ensure that the system’s functional baseline is established and that the system has a reasonable 
expectation of satisfying the requirement of the ICD within the currently allocated budget and 
schedule” (Carter 2010).  Figure 33 shows the implementation of the SDR process flow.   
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Figure 33: SDR Submodel 
For SDR, the Space Specific sub-model in Figure 34 includes the IPA support of the Post 
SDR assessment.   The “What IF” path was removed for SDR due to the fact that all SDRs 
include an IPA.  Where there is a mandatory IPA immediately after the SDR, Figure 35 describes 
that activity’s implementation.  This illustrates an example of the process required for interacting 
between SMC/XR model developers and the authors of this report.   
 
 
Figure 34: Space Specific Submodel 
Figure 35 demonstrates a draft implementation of the “What IF” sub-model.  This is a 
small portion of code that implements some of the activities described in the Space Systems 
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Acquisition Policy DTM.   It describes additional activities to be associated with each review at 
the MDA level in addition to the typical milestone reviews.   “The MDA shall conduct a formal 
program assessment following the SDR for space systems. The SDR provides an opportunity to 
assess satisfaction of user needs through functional decomposition and traceability of 
requirements from the ICD to the contractor’s functional baseline and system specification. An 
IPA shall be provided to support the P-SDRA” (Carter 2010).  The “What IF” sub-model checks 
to determine if an IPA is requested by the MDA.  For SDRs, the IPA will always be required to 
support the MDA’s post SDR assessment.   For PDR and CDR, the MDA can decide whether or 
not to receive support from an IPA.  Hence, the “What IF” sub-model performs that check 
following the particular review.  If the MDA does not approve, there is a single rework cycle for 
the SPO to make corrections.  For the PDR and CDR post assessments, the “What If” sub-model 
is included as a check to see if the MDA requests IPA support.   
 
 
Figure 35: "What If" Submodel 
MDA approval is needed after the affordability assessment if the cost growth is greater 
than 25% over the original estimate.  
“If, during Technology Development, the cost estimate upon which the MDA based the 
Milestone A certification increases by 25 percent or more, the PM shall notify the MDA 
of the increase.  The MDA shall again consult with the JROC on matters related to 
program requirements and the military need(s) of the system.  The MDA shall determine 
whether the level of resources required to develop and procure the system remains 
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consistent with the priority level assigned by the JROC.  If not, the MDA may rescind the 
Milestone A approval if the MDA determines that such action is in the interest of national 
defense”  (OUSD/ATL 2008).   
 
This was implemented after the Affordability Assessment in the Pre MS-B activity.  Figure 36 
describes how the DoDI 5000.02 text was turned into a process flow diagram.  This evolved into 
an implementation shown in Figure 37.  Figure 38 shows how the Cost Growth Check sub-model 
was added into the main flow if the ExtendSim® implementation  
 
 
 
Figure 36: Notional Cost Growth Process Flow 
 
 
Figure 37: Cost Growth Check Submodel 
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Figure 38: Cost Growth Check in Main Flow 
 Therefore, the above changes were implemented into ERAM 1.2 as a portion of the 
collaboration effort with SMC/XR.  The DoDI 5000.02 guidance was checked to ensure that the 
independent cost estimate (ICE) activities in ERAM 1.2 accurately reflected the updates to the 
DoDI 5000.02.  The structure of the flow did not change in the ICE portion.  The Clinger-Cohen 
Act Acceptance/Review process was incorporated as a significant event.  Additionally, the IPAs 
and Post-SDR/PDR/CDR assessments were added which have a significant impact on program 
timelines.  They also add potential exit points to ERAM 1.2 with probabilities.   
ERAM 2.0 
ERAM 2.0 incorporated the global variable of acquisition capability into ERAM 1.2.  
Table 4 identifies areas where an ERAM user can identify the appropriate level to reflect the 
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capabilities of the SPO.   Appendix B documents the activities selected that will be impacted by 
this global variable.  The global variable has levels from 0 to 4 which determine the triangular 
distribution impact for the timelines of the discrete events.  Figure 39 shows a notional view of 
how the distributions will be impacted based on experience and staffing levels.  The “y” axis 
shows the probabilities while the “x” axis shows the timelines in number of days.  It suggests 
lower capability skews events longer, while higher capability skews the event to be completed in 
a more timely fashion.  Level 2 is considered a baseline level which doesn’t skew activities as 
modeled in any direction. 
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Figure 39: Notional Triangular Distribution Timeline Impacts 
ERAM 2.1 
In order to implement the JCIDS process in ERAM 1.2, several changes and additions 
were required.  The Microsoft VISIO diagram that was reviewed with the requirements and 
acquisition personnel was compared with ERAM 1.2 to determine insertion points and changes.  
Table 14 outlines the activities recommended for implementation in ERAM 2.1.   
PersonnelExperience Global Variable Inputs
Level 0
Time
Level 1
Time
Level 2
Time
Level 3
Time
Level 4
Time
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Table 15: JCIDS Model Changes 
 
 Model Changes 
1 Add JCIDS Initiation 
2 Add/Update JCIDS Concept Review Process 
3 Add Development Planning Initiation 
4 Add CCTD Development Process 
5 Add/Update MDD Process 
6 Update AoA Process 
7 Add JUON Process 
 
Figures 40 and 41 demonstrate how the model design was recommended to the 
Aerospace software engineers to fully implement the pre-MDD JCIDS activities.  In Figure 40, 
the first column of activities represents potential sources of “ideas” for capabilities and/or 
concepts that are injected into the “AFSPC IPP & ATC”.  The “AFSPC IPP & ATD” at a given 
point in time will prioritize and select which capabilities to pursue further.  The first step is to 
compare the capability against existing ICDs.  If one exists, it by-passes the JROC ICD approval 
flow.  However, if it requires a new ICD, depending on if the capability or technology is a paper 
concept, a prototype/JCTD or an ATD will determine which activity path it follows.  Translating 
this to code, the “For existing Program” icon in Figure 41 becomes a user selected “pull-down 
menu” to choose ATD, Paper Concepts, or others.     
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Figure 40: JCIDS Initiation 
 
 
 
Figure 41: JCIDS Initiation ExtendSim Implementation 
 Figures 42 through 44 describe the concepts as they proceed through the CBA process.  
The concept then goes through a DOTMLPF decision.  It follows separate paths based upon 
sponsorship from either AFSPC or USTRATCOM.  If it is sponsored by USTRATCOM, it 
bypasses the Air Force specific processes.  The implementation included reuse of existing code 
from the Joint Interest pre MS-B sub-model shown in Figure 43.  A significant difference is that 
the USTRATCOM sponsored concept will bypass the AFROC and insert directly into the middle 
of the Joint Interest sub-model.  The Functional Review Board in Figure 41 occurs in the Joint 
Interest sub-model.   
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Figure 42: JCIDS Concept Review Process 
 
Figure 43: JCIDS Concept Review Process ExtendSim Implementation Part 1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44: JCIDS Concept Review Process ExtendSim Implementation Part 2 
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Figures 45 and 46 describe the initiation of the DP process initiated after an ICD is 
approved.  This AFSPC initiated processes sends the DP Request to SMC/XR or SPO for an 
existing program of record.  This is then reviewed and processed through the AFSPC led 
prioritization process.   
 
 
Figure 45: Development Planning Initiation 
 
 
Figure 46: Development Planning Initiation ExtendSim Implementation 
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 Figures 47 and 48 describe the various steps that SMC/XR or a SPO XR branch 
accomplishes as they complete the CCTD effort.  The CCTD process owner accomplishes five 
phases, as shown in Figure 47.  In the implementation in Figure 48, the five phases are executed 
sequentially as a substitute for the DP block.  This is in concert with the intent of the designer.  
However, as the design team and the software engineers met, the 5 CCTD phases were 
aggregated back up to a single DP activity block.   
 
 
Figure 47: CCTD Development Process 
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Figure 48: CCTD Development Process ExtendSim Implementation 
 Figures 49 and 50 describe how the MDD and approval were modeled.  The ADM and 
MDD brief submitted to the MDD result in a decision which either terminates the program or 
sends it further down the process to begin an AoA.  The implementation in Figure 50 reused 
existing ERAM 1.1 code and clarified the processes to include the AFRB.   
 
 
Figure 49: MDD Process 
 
 
Figure 50: MDD Process ExtendSim Implementation 
 Figures 51 through 53 show the AoA design and implementation through the point the 
program is inserted into the acquisition process based on the ADM.  Existing ERAM 1.1 code 
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was reused which captured the detail of the AoA process through developing courses of action.  
In Figure 53, the different insertion points after a preferred concept is selected and the 3 way 
branch either continues in the pre MS-A, or jumps to pre MS-B or pre MS-C.   
 
 
Figure 51: Analysis of Alternatives 
 
Figure 52: Analysis of Alternatives ExtendSim Implementation Part 1 
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Figure 53: Analysis of Alternatives ExtendSim Implementation Part 2 
 Figures 54 through 57 show the separate JUON process.  If the user selected menu in 
Figure 40 and 41 selects JUON, it follows the new path.  This path ends at a fielded capability if 
it passes all of the review processes.  The final decision results in a branching that selects 
whether or not it will become an enduring program and go into the official process, be disposed 
of or sustained exclusively in the theater of operations.   
 
Figure 54: JUON Process Part 1 
 
Figure 55: JUON Process Part 1 ExtendSim Implementation 
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Figure 56: JUON Process Part 2 
 
Figure 57: JUON Process Part 2 ExtendSim Implementation 
4.5 Phase 5:  Document and Report 
 At the conclusion of these interviews, modeling updates, document reviews, etc, the 
research team captured the data and documented the findings.  These findings were also 
presented orally on multiple occasions for academic purposes and to satisfy the requirements of 
the sponsoring organization.   A final review was conducted with the Aerospace software 
engineers to ensure they had obtained the required data for completing the model 
implementation.    
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V. Conclusion & Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusion 
Unfortunately, defense space acquisitions have earned a reputation of being notoriously 
over budget and behind schedule.  Not surprisingly, Congressional and senior DoD leadership 
have recently focused efforts on identifying the root cause in order to improve program 
execution.  As previously reported by the GAO, this research also found that many early space 
program decisions have been based on insufficient and/or inaccurate data with regards to 
schedule and cost estimates as well as technology maturity.  In an abstract relationship, a DoD 
capability gap exists for its ability to properly estimate and execute the cost and schedule to 
deliver new capabilities. 
In an effort to provide a solution to this capability gap, policy and statutory guidance has 
been updated in the past several years emphasizing the importance of early systems engineering, 
DP, and assessing technology maturity in advance of MS B.  Tools such as ERAM, RAMP, 
ADDM and APM continue to gain attention as they provide insight into the acquisition system 
and help characterize the various decisions points and activity timelines.  Through the process of 
updating ERAM for space acquisitions, the following are several valuable observations for 
potential contributions to the current challenges faced in space capability development: 
1) ERAM provides a comprehensive early schedule estimate based upon existing 
government policy and instructions, a valuable piece of data currently missing.  For a 
given concept, this data should be captured in the CCTD and properly assessed in the 
AoA prior to a materiel solution being selected. 
2) ERAM provides insight into the extraordinarily complex process of developing space 
capabilities.  A single model that comprehensively ties the multitude of processes and 
organizations outlined by DoD and AF policy, instructions, and guides has the 
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potential reducing and simplifying the process into an understandable and 
manageable process for requirements and acquisition personnel. 
3) ERAM provides detailed context to the well known, but too often in comprehensible, 
DAU acquisition wall chart.  The DAU wall chart provides a high level picture of the 
activities, but, lacks the detail to be an effective management tool.  ERAM’s activity 
diagram identifies the sequence of activities/decisions, the organizations responsible 
for them and estimated timelines for the activities, resulting in a management tool that 
empowers PMs to more effective. 
4) ERAM could become the backbone of a training program for DoD and industry PMs 
providing detailed insight to current space acquisition policy and processes; a type of 
program management “flight simulator”. 
5) ERAM is an asset available for SMC/XR to utilize during DP efforts (developing 
CCTDs) for AFSPC with regards to “revolutionary” capabilities while existing SPO 
XR shops can leverage SMC/XR CCTD expertise and ERAM for AFSPC directed 
“evolutionary” capabilities DP. 
At the beginning of this research effort, three objectives were established: update ERAM 
for space capability development in ExtendSim modeling software, verify and validate the model 
and lastly, provide recommendations for further research efforts (if required). 
The first objective of updating ERAM in ExtendSim for space acquisitions was achieved; 
however, additional research remains in order to reach a version capable of providing usable data 
for CCTDs.  Research efforts found that there is no single “correct” process that everyone agrees 
upon or one that can be designed from published guidance.  The myriad of policy memos, 
instructions and guides are difficult to tie together into a single activity diagram; rather, they 
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provide a framework that must be navigated uniquely for every program.  Despite these 
challenges, a generally accepted framework has been designed and implemented as ERAM 2.1.  
Nevertheless, the authors used their own expertise and knowledge gained during this research to 
suggest notional data that can be refined later.  Rather, the data generated by the authors is of 
high quality with reliable resources and meets the triangulation method of validation (Patton and 
Denzin, qtd. in Scharch, et al. 2011).  This was accomplished through interviews with SMEs 
familiar with space capability development pre MS-A, analysis of existing policy and guidance 
governing capability development as well as comparing the model to current, real world pre MS-
A space concepts.  Objective three was met and documented in the “Recommendations” portion 
of this report.  
5.2 Recommendations 
 With all of the uncertainty and variability within the DoD acquisition process, there will 
always be modeling opportunities to improve the fidelity.  As Statistician George Box stated, 
“All models are wrong, but some are useful.” (Box Vol 71)  The following are several research 
topics that would continue to increase the utility of ERAM for space capability development: 
1) PPB&E Activities/Decisions: More detailed research into modeling PPB&E Activities would 
add realism to the model.  This calendar driven-process drives the funding available to program 
managers at various stages.  Spring execution reviews and other events have the potential to 
remove funding from the program.  This process exists in ERAM, but would be improved with 
further research.  
2) T&E Activities/Decisions: Test and Evaluation as a significant portion of the acquisition 
community is a good candidate for research emphasis on future spirals of ERAM.  It is included 
in the current version of ERAM but at a high level of abstraction.  Coordination with the 
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Operational Test community is essential early in acquisition with Test and Evaluation Master 
Plans required at Milestone reviews.       
3) ERAM Maintenance: In general terms, further research in probability distributions for 
activities and decision points would increase the fidelity of the model.  Larger sampling of 
subject matter experts will further refine the spans of the distribution.  Keeping up with the 
frequent policy changes will also add to the maintenance of ERAM. 
4) Improve acquisition modeling efforts between SAF/AQ, AFMC, and the XR shops at ASC, 
ESC, AAC and SMC to reduce duplication of effort and maximize synergies between various 
models. 
5) Analyze how the cost of early SE and increased quantitative analysis impact the overall 
performance (cost and schedule) of programs compared to previous programs with little early SE 
(utility analysis).  These observations could then be folded into future versions of ERAM. 
6) Further development and analysis of the rapid acquisition process (JUONs as well as other 
techniques). 
In the process of identifying a comprehensive activity diagram that ties S&T, AFSPC 
capability gap analysis, JCIDS, DP and eventually the acquisition of a materiel solution, several 
general challenge areas with regards to space capability development are discussed: 
Challenge #1: Inadequate Early Systems Engineering.  Lack of early systems engineering 
results in a weak technical foundation for the system to be built upon and results in an increased 
number of risks and “unknown unknowns”.  Too often, the hard questions are pushed off to be 
addressed later in the program, resulting in costly schedule delays.  
Proposed Solution: Improve early systems engineering analysis prior to MDD and MS-A 
approval.  Early systems engineering will help identify and assess the risks associated with these 
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questions before major program decisions occur, preventing more costly impacts further into the 
program.  Recent guidance has directed this; however, implementation is still in progress.  It is 
recommend that to overcome the challenges that remain 1) assign responsibility to a single 
organization, and 2) find/hire technically competent systems engineers to develop the space 
architecture, and 3) choose a single systems engineering software suite that is required for use by 
all services.   
Challenge #2: Failure of the Government to Assess Technology Maturity.  Poor technology 
maturity assessments prior to contract award results in costly schedule delays.   
Proposed Solution:  To accurately assess technology maturity levels, the government must 
improve its technical knowledge base and establish improved evaluation methods.  Rather than 
accept ideas at face value as “good”, proving the feasibility must be required.  Improving the 
process for AFRL, universities and industry partners to prove military utility of hardware and 
software technologies in advance of contract award will likely significantly improve contract 
performance post Milestone B.  
Challenge #3:  Improper Distribution of Personnel.  Developing new space capabilities and 
sustaining existing capabilities is indeed a challenging endeavor.  In response, in the opinion of 
the authors, the number of personnel supporting HHQs appears to continue to increase, resulting 
in significant manpower (and associated costs) charged with developing new and improved 
policy and instructions.  At the product centers, very few PMs can piece the policy architecture 
together or have the time to in order to make sense of how the multi-organizational process is 
designed to work.  
Proposed Solution:  First, reduce and consolidate the number of guidance documents.  Ensure 
the documents are consistent with one another and establish a coherent process flow that doesn’t 
119 
 
require a genius to understand.  After this is accomplished, second, reallocate the manpower 
positions supporting HHQ to support the personnel at the Centers.  Third, with a portion of these 
resources, establish a rigorous formal training and evaluation program that qualifies personnel 
assigned to key positions.  Current DAU training is insufficient; just as operators have formal 
training to learn how to operate their weapon system and understand technical orders, personnel 
involved in the acquisition system should be required to understand the acquisition system and 
associated instructions. In addition to initial training requirements, establish recurring training 
and evaluation programs that re-enforces and sustains the knowledge base.  Fourth, with the 
remaining reallocated resources from HHQs, increase the number of technical positions at the 
Centers.  It’s the Centers that are responsible for early systems engineering, CCTD documents 
and executing programs on schedule and within cost and it’s the Centers that have historically 
struggled.    
Challenge #4: Lack of Process Discipline & Training.  Individual organizations (AFSPC, 
SMC, AFRL, SAF, OSD, AFOTEC) all have their individual processes and procedures for 
fulfilling their responsibilities.  With senior leadership within these organizations turning over 
approximately every two years, there is a good chance that those processes/products change 
every two years.  This is not surprising since there are so many issues throughout the entire 
system.  The intentions of these changes are positive, but the results have far reaching 
implications that aren’t properly communicated/trained and difficult to absorb.  This impairs the 
ability for other organizations dependent on that organization to understand how the process 
works.  Additionally, it makes it extremely difficult to establish value added training curriculum 
since the material would become outdated more quickly than it could be approved. 
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Proposed Solution:  Establish organizational process discipline.  Should organizations choose to 
change processes that impacts other organizations in the “system”, then there should be a formal 
change process.  Part of the process would require outreach training to other organizations that 
rely on them for their own success/progress. 
Challenge #5:  Poor 6X Training & Evaluation Program.  Acquisition personnel are required 
by law to take training courses offered by the Defense Acquisition University and maintain 
Continuous Learning Points.  This training is insufficient and only scratches the surface with 
regards to how the acquisition system truly functions.   
Proposed Solution:  DoD and SAF need to establish a formal training and evaluation program 
for requirements and acquisition personnel.  AETC is responsible for operational system 
qualification training for both intelligence, space and aerospace system operations.  Additionally, 
the operational units have established formal evaluations to ensure the qualification and 
proficiency of the operators.  The requirements and acquisition system is certainly different, 
however, establishing formal training and evaluation programs could enforce an in depth 
understanding of the processes and pay significant dividends to ensure personnel are 
knowledgeable and qualified.  Additionally, this may serve as a forcing function to HHQ to 
reduce and simplify the policy guidance and instill process discipline throughout various 
organizations involved.   
Challenge #6: Process Disconnects between MAJCOM & AFRL.  The S&T process for 
focusing defense resources on maturing technologies for desired capabilities is disjointed from 
AFSPC and the JCIDS process. 
Proposed Solution:  AFSPC needs to improve its ability to communicate technology 
development requirements to AFRL.  AFRL needs to improve their responsiveness to AFSPC on 
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these efforts.  At the same time, AFRL must also continue to provide AFSPC with ideas on 
emerging military technology applications so the classified capability development strategies can 
continue to evolve. 
In conclusion, failure to for the Department of Defense to take actions to improve an 
inadequate space acquisition system threatens the United States supremacy in space as well as its 
national security.  Adversaries are increasing their ability to develop technologies and field them 
at an alarming rate, closing the technology gap America has become accustomed to.  From 
President Obama’s National Security Strategy, “We will invest in the research and development 
of next-generation space technologies and capabilities that benefit our commercial, civil, 
scientific exploration, and national security communities, in order to maintain the viability of 
space for future generations.”  In a fiscally constrained environment, as the service responsible 
for space capabilities, the United States Air Force must tackle this challenge.  ERAM is not the 
solution to the major problem, but can provide valuable context to the extraordinarily complex 
capability development system that requires significant reform. 
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APPENDIX A. List of Acronyms 
 
ACAT Acquisition Category 
ACE Acquisition Center of Excellence 
ACPO Acquisition Chief Process Office 
ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
ADDM Acquisition Document Development and Management 
AIP Acquisition Improvement Plan 
APM Acquisition Process Model 
ATD Advanced Technology Demonstration 
ASC Aeronautical Systems Center 
AAC 
ACPO 
Air Armament Center 
Acquisition Chief Process Office 
AFIT Air Force Institute of Technology 
AFMC  Air Force Materiel Command 
AFMCI Air Force Materiel Command Instruction 
AFPC Air Force Personnel Command 
AFPD 
AFRB 
Air Force Policy Document 
Air Force Review Board 
AFROC Air Force Requirements Oversight Council 
AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory 
AFSPC Air Force Space Command 
AFSPCI Air Force Space Command Instruction 
AMA Analysis of the Materiel Alternatives 
ATC Applied Technology Council 
ASD/NII Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks Information & Integration 
CDD Capabilities Development Document 
CBA Capabilities-Based Assessment 
CPD Capability Production Document 
CRET Center for Re-engineering Technology 
COCOM Combatant Command 
C2 Command and Control 
CCTD Concept Characterization and Technical Description 
CDC Concept Development Center 
CO Contracting Officer 
CAPE Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation 
CTE Critical Technology Element 
DAB Defense Acquisition Board 
DAU 
DoD 
Defense Acquisition University 
Department of Defense 
DoDI Department of Defense Instruction 
DP Development Planning 
DTM Directive Type Memorandum 
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ESC Electronic Systems Center 
ECP Engineering Change Proposal 
ERAM Enterprise Requirements and Acquisition Model 
FCB 
FFRDC 
Functional Capabilities Board 
Federally Funded Research and Development Center 
FSA 
GAO 
Functional Solutions Analysis 
Government Accountability Office  
GRP Group Research Project 
HPT High Performance Team 
HHQ Higher Headquarters 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
ICE Independent Cost Estimate 
IPA Independent Program Assessment 
IRAD Independent Research and Development 
IRSS Information and Resource Support System 
IT Information Technology 
ICD Initial Capability Document 
IPP Integrated Planning Process 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
JCB Joint Capabilities Board 
JCA Joint Capability Area 
JCIDS Joint Capability Integration and Development System 
JCTD Joint Capability Technology Demonstration 
JPD Joint Potential Designator 
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
JUON Joint Urgent Operational Need 
KPP Key Performance Parameter 
KM/DS Knowledge Management/Decision Support 
MAJCOM Major Command 
MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Program 
MDD Materiel Development Decision 
MS Milestone 
MDA  Milestone Decision Authority 
MUA Military Utility Assessment 
NRO National Reconnaissance Office 
OSD/AT&L Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
P-SDRA Pre-System Design Review Assessment 
PE Program Element 
PEO Program Executive Officer 
PM&AE Program Management & Acquisition Excellence 
PM Program Manager 
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POM Program Objectives Memorandum 
PPB&E Program, Planning, Budget & Execution 
RAMP Requirements and Management Plan 
RSR Requirements Strategy Review 
RMD Resource Management Decision 
S&T Science & Technology 
SAF/AECO Secretary of the Air Force,  Acquisition Excellence Change Office 
SAF/AQ Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisitions 
SAF/AQRE 
 
Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisitions Engineering & Technical 
Management Division 
SCF Service Core Functions 
SMC/XR SMC Development Planning Division 
SMC Space and Missile Systems Center 
SRP Space Re-capitalization Plan 
SSAP Space Systems Acquisition Policy 
SMP Strategic Master Plan 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SDD System Design & Demonstration 
SDR System Design Review 
SPO System(s) Program Office 
TDS Technology Development Strategy 
TRA Technology Readiness Assessment 
TRL 
TSAT 
Technology Readiness Level 
Transformational Satellite Communications System 
USD/AT&L Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 
USTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 
WSARA Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act 
WBS Work Breakdown Structure 
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APPENDIX B. ERAM 2.0 Activities Impacted by Capability Matrix 
Delay for protest 
Delay for protest review PreB 
Delay for protest review PreC 
EOA rework and delay 
MAJCOM approval PreA 
AFROC Preparations PreA 
AFROC Preparations independent document PreA 
AFROC Preparation joint interest PreA 
AFROC Document Review joint interest PreA 
FCB and JCB joint interest PreA 
AFROC Preparations independent document PreB 
AFROC Preparations joint integration PreB 
Final AFROC approval joint integrations PreB 
AFROC Preparations joint interest PreB 
AFROC Document Review joint interest PreB 
FCB and JCB and JROC joint interest PreB 
AFROC Preparations independent document PreC 
AFROC Preparations joint integration PreC 
Final AFROC Approval joint integration PreC 
AFROC Preparations joint interest PreC 
AFROC Document Review joint interest PreC 
FCB and JCB and JROC joint interest PreC 
MAJCOM Approval independent document PreA 
MAJCOM A Letters and Coordination and Concur 
MAJCOM A8 and RSR 
MAJCOM Approval joint integrations PreA 
MAJCOM Approval Later joint integration PreA 
MAJCOM Approval joint interest PreA 
MAJCOM Approval independent document PreB 
MAJCOM A Letter and Coordinate and Concur PreB 
MAJCOM A8 and RSR 
MAJCOM Approval joint integration PreB 
MAJCOM Approval Later joint integration PreB 
MAJCOM Approval joint interest PreB 
MAJCOM A Letter Coordination and Concur PreC 
MAJCOM A8 and RSR PreC 
MAJCOM Approval Independent document PreC 
MAJCOM Approval joint integration PreC 
MAJCOM Approval Later joint integration PreC 
MAJCOM Approval joint interest PreC 
SVR 
DRR 
SRR 
MDA Milestone Approval PreB 
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MDA Milestone Approval PreC 
MDA Milestone A Approval 
RFP Release and Source Sel Pre-B 
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APPENDIX C. Sample Interview Questions 
 
1) Describe your roles and responsibilities in the space acquisition processes. 
 
2) What space programs do you have experience with? 
 
3) Describe what processes you’ve been involved with regards to space capability 
development (i.e. gap analysis, S&T, JCIDS documents, DP, and/or acquisitions) and 
with which program 
 
4) Describe the specific activities and decision points for the processes you’ve been 
involved in from question 3. 
 
5) What reviews and documentation were required for your program? 
 
6) In your opinion, was there a clearly identified sponsor (i.e. owner) for the documentation 
required for the reviews?  If not, please describe the discrepancy. 
 
7) What was the timeframe for approval on the required documentation?  Which 
organizations were required for coordination?  What obstacles needed to be overcome?   
 
8) Have you experienced delays with your program?  If so, what would you say was the 
primary driver of that delay? 
 
9) When did the various reviews and other meetings occur in your program?  Who was 
required to attend?  What were the challenges that arose?  How did you overcome those 
challenges? 
 
10) If applicable, what waivers were applicable for moving your program forward?  How did 
you obtain approval for those waivers? 
 
11) In the future, as a framework of the activities from capability gap analysis through 
Materiel Development Decision is developed, would you be willing to review it and 
provide feedback for accuracy?   
 
12) In reference to the previous question, would you be willing to provide data on the 
durations of the activities and probabilities for decision points? 
 
13) Do you have any specific persons we should talk to at AFSPC, SAF/AQ, USD/AT&L, or 
other agencies? 
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14) Do you have anything else you would like us to consider with regards to modeling and 
reporting on the pre Milestone-B space acquisition activities? 
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